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1. INTRODUCTION
Property sets out the ways in which society allocates, governs, and
enforces rights and duties among persons with respect to resources. The
boundaries of property are constantly changing. They influence and are
influenced by social, economic, and political shifts. Nowadays, in view of ever-
intensifying foreign investments and other cross-border ventures, the institution
of property may face its greatest challenge ever: the transition from a largely
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domestic legal construct into one that accommodates globalization.
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) appear to offer an ideal solution for
the protection of foreign investors' property rights in the broad range of assets
that BITs typically consider to be "investments": land, chattels, intellectual
property, securities, intangibles, and so forth. BITs regularly include certain
standards for the protection of foreign investments, such as "fair and equitable
treatment," and provide investors with standing in international law and direct
claims vis-A-vis the host country. The alleged promise of BITs lies in reducing
uncertainty and enhancing the credibility of states' commitments to protect
property rights.
"Explosion" is a term often used to describe the growth trend in the
number of BITs.1 The numbers are staggering even to people familiar with the
field; no fewer than 2,676 BITs had been concluded by the end of 2008, and
2
virtually every country has been a party to at least one agreement of this type.
If everybody has them, then one might think that BITs must be doing
something quite beneficial. As we point out in this Article, however, BITs may
do a lot,3 but their effect on securing cross-border property rights is far from
clear.
Our main source of skepticism regarding the ability of BITs to
systematically promote the protection of property rights beyond property law's
traditional boundaries lies in our argument that the notion of property is
significantly more complex than first meets the eye. The gradual move to what
we term "property discourse" to protect foreign investment under a BIT regime
consequently may become complex and uncertain. This Article breaks ranks
from conventional wisdom by identifying the intricacies of BIT property
protection and pointing to heterogeneity as a central feature of property. Unlike
the paradigm that seems to guide the creation of BITs, which emphasizes
certainty and credibility, we argue that once property jurisprudence is
introduced into BITs, the complex features of property law follow.
We demonstrate the ways in which property rights and duties regularly
1. See, e.g., U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN ATrRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, at 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5, U.N. Sales No. E.09.11.D.20 (2009) (referring
to "an explosive growth of international investment agreements (HAs)").
2. Id.
3. BIT scholarship has more than its fair share of puns. Apparently, they are irresistible, and
we can only admit to the same weakness as our title already betrays. See, e.g., Mary Hallward-
Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit ... and They Could Bite, in THE
EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE
TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 349 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009)
[hereinafter EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT]; Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT:
The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing
Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655 (1990); Jennifer L. Tobin & Marc L. Busch, A BIT is Better Than a Lot:
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements, 62 WORLD POL. 1 (2010); Jennifer
Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: The Political-Economic Environment for
Bilateral Investment Treaties, REV. INT'L ORG. (forthcoming), available at http://www.springerlink
.com/content/c7h372354665221 1/fulltext.pdf; Matthias Busse, Jens Koniger & Peter Nunnenkamp, FDI
Promotion Through Bilateral Investment Treaties: More than a BIT? (Kiel Inst. World Econ., Working
Paper No. 1403, 2008), available at http://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/fdi-promotion-
through-bilateral-investment-treaties-more-than-a-bit/Kiel% 20Working%20Paper*/o201403.pdf.
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implicate numerous, often heterogeneous parties, whose interests may be
tightly intertwined in the same piece of property. In addition, the public aspect
of property rules-touching on expropriation and regulation-is not entirely
detached from the private law of property. Consequently, a property regime,
with its in rem traits and cross-field effects, may be difficult to sustain when a
specific BIT or a tribunal applying it takes out one piece of the puzzle to
resolve an isolated investor-state dispute. We thus argue that to properly meet
their goals, cross-border investment mechanisms must come to terms with the
entire array of jurisprudential dilemmas that characterize property systems.
This Article is structured as follows. Part II reviews the development of
the BIT movement and the theories that underlie their design as property-
protecting mechanisms. In Part III, we identify a prominent phenomenon in the
legal context of BITs, by which the evolving understanding and interpretation
of treaty terms such as "investment," "rights," "protection," or "expropriation"
increasingly tilt these international mechanisms toward a general "property
discourse"-i.e., the depiction of foreign investors' interests as property rights
that enjoy not only status as such within the host country's legal system, but
also a superior, quasi-constitutional status as extraterritorial legal norms, in
case of insufficient protection by the host country. In other words, investors
constantly look to ensure broader protection of their property rights through
BITs by seeking to create their own property lex specialis. We argue, however,
that the notion of property is too complex for such an aspiration. To
demonstrate why this is so, Part III articulates the unique traits of property
rights and shows that even when a property discourse is initially defined with a
"public" viewpoint in mind (i.e., regulating the legal relationship between the
private investor/owner and the relevant government), such a design is bound to
influence and be influenced by the "private" aspect of property law (i.e., the set
of norms that generally regulate in rem legal interrelations among private
persons regarding the allocation, governance, and protection of rights and
duties in assets). This means that the growing tendency toward a BIT property
discourse will have broader implications than originally anticipated, leading to
a complicated tension among BIT (international) property law, domestic
property law, and other legal norms.
Part IV elaborates on what we refer to as the intricacies of BIT property
protection, pointing to heterogeneity as a central notion that complicates the
transfer of the property discourse from a locally based jurisprudence to an
overarching, universal design concept that could govern the scope and content
of BITs. We identify five different types of such heterogeneity: (1) cultural
heterogeneity among societies in their approaches to the concept of property;
(2) actor heterogeneity; (3) asset heterogeneity; (4) vertical heterogeneity, or
fragmentation of property norms at supranational and domestic levels; and (5)
horizontal heterogeneity of overlapping investment protection norms. Our
analysis is supported by new empirical evidence on the relationship between
culture and property rights protection. Specifically, in regressions of measures
of property rights on countries' cultural profiles derived from cross-cultural
psychology, we find that the protection of property rights is enhanced by
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cultural autonomy-a cultural orientation that emphasizes individuals'
uniqueness-and is attenuated by the opposite orientation, embeddedness,
which views people as entities embedded in the collectivity. This effect is
especially pronounced for intellectual property rights. Part V concludes with
several policy implications for cross-border investments in view of the tension
between the aspiration of BITs to provide security and stability and the
inevitable complexity embedded in the concept of property.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF BITS
A. BITs Today
In order to fully appreciate the BIT phenomenon, one should consider its
current scope even before addressing the origins and the typical content of
BITs. This scope is nothing short of staggering. According to the statistics
available in early 2010, there were 2,676 concluded BITs by the end of 2008.4
Figure 1 presents this trend during the past decade. Every country except
Monaco is a party to at least one BIT.5 Many countries have dozens of BITs,
and several countries have more than one hundred BITs or close to this
number; Germany leads the pack with over 130 BITs. This corpus of BITs is a
living body. During the last decade, between eight and fourteen BITs have been
renegotiated every year, such that the share of renegotiated BITs is about five
percent of their total number and is rising steadily. Some countries renegotiate
their BITs in order to bring them in line with the European Union framework
upon accession to the Union; other countries update their BITs in light of new
model BITs. BITs are also denounced from time to time.
4. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Recent Developments in International Investment
Agreements (2008-June 2009), at 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/8 (2009), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf. This number accounts for new BITs (adding to
the total), terminated and denounced BITs (subtracting from the total), and renegotiated BITs (replacing
old BITs), as well as data adjustments in line with country reporting.
5. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEv., supra note 1, at 2.
6. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note 4, at 2-3.
7. Id. at 5-6.
8. Id.
118
BITs and Pieces of Property











1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev.9
Countries at all levels of economic development and in every corner of
the world are parties to BITs. Importantly, BITs are not limited to developed-
developing country dyads. Indeed, only forty-two percent of all BITs are
between a developed country and a developing one. Over a quarter of all BITs
have now been concluded between pairs of developing countries. China and
India appear to be leading this trend of South-South integration through BITs.
Another eight percent have been concluded between, on the one hand,
developing countries and, on the other, countries in Southern and Eastern
Europe and countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States,
which is made up of countries that were part of the Soviet Union or the Soviet
Bloc. Some nine percent of BITs are between developed country dyads.' 0
BITs have transformed the global legal landscape of international
investment. In light of their sheer number it would be safe to assume that BITs
today cover most, though not all, of the cross-country channels of international
investment." Inasmuch as activity volume is an indicator of success, the BITs
movement constitutes one of the most successful movements in the history of
international law.
9. We are grateful to Amara Bekele from the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) for providing the data behind this chart. Letter from Amara Bekele, DIAE/UNCTAD, to
authors (Feb. 2, 2010) (on file with authors).
10. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note 4, at 3-5.
11. To our knowledge, only the network of double taxation treaties (DT-s), which totaled
2,805 by the end of 2008, surpasses BITs. Id. at 7. UNCTAD subsumes BITs and DTTs under the
category of international investment agreements, or HAs.
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B. From the Beginning 2
The origin of BITs is commonly traced to the first BIT signed in 1959
between Germany and Pakistan. As the standard story goes, numerous former
colonies became independent countries in the wake of World War II and were
almost invariably at a much lower level of economic development than former
colonial countries. The latter countries also happened to be European, Western,
or Northern. Shortly thereafter, during the 1950s, a number of developing
countries embarked on a series of massive expropriations of assets and
enterprises that had been funded and owned by foreign investors. Iran
expropriated British petroleum assets in 1951, and Libya expropriated joint
Libyan-American petroleum assets in 1955. In 1956, Egypt nationalized the
Anglo-French-owned Suez Canal, and in 1959 Cuba nationalized an array of
foreign commercial assets. With ebbs and flows, nationalizations and
expropriations have been a recurring theme on the scene of international
investment, reaching another peak during the 1970sl 3 and never truly
disappearing to this day.14
BITs, according to this story line, were supposed to be the answer to these
expropriations, aiming to allay foreign investors' concerns about losing their
investment without appropriate compensation. BITs therefore implemented
three measures: first, a commitment by host countries to extend a certain
standard of treatment toward foreign investment, including a crucial
commitment to compensate for expropriation; second, a direct right of action
for individual and corporate investors against host states; and third, resolution
of disputes by international arbitration, most often through the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).15 This concise set of
12. This Subsection draws extensively from PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND THE LAw 617-20 (1995); Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for
the Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 491, 499-504 (2009);
Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 71-79 (2005); and Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 157, 157-76 (2005).
13. The United Nations identified 875 distinct acts of governmental taking of foreign property
in sixty-two countries between 1960 and 1974. See Don C. Piper, New Directions in the Protection of
American-Owned Property Abroad, 4 INT'L TRADE L.J. 315, 330 (1979).
14. For a detailed account of a very recent, and colossal, expropriation by Chad,
notwithstanding the involvement of the World Bank, see Scott Pegg, Briefing, Chronicle of a Death
Foretold: The Collapse of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, 108 AFR. AFF. 311 (2009). In another
recent episode of massive de facto expropriation, the Russian government from 2004 to 2008 used
regulatory tactics to force
Royal Dutch Shell and its partners to sell a controlling stake in Sakhalin-2 [natural gas
field] to [the national oil company] Gazprom and forced TNK-BP to give up its giant
Kovykta gas field in East Siberia. By 2008, the share of state-owned companies in oil
production had grown from about 27 percent to almost 40 percent of oil output.
Judith Thornton, The Impact of Nationalization and Insecure Property Rights on Oil and Gas
Developments in Russia's Asia Pacific 6 (U. Wash. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. UWEC-2009-
22, 2009), available at http://www.econ.washington.edu/user/thornj/fhomton-w-energyEdited-maps
.pdf.
15. ICSID is by far the most popular arbitration framework of choice in BITs. A distant
second is the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). See Rafael Leal-Arcas,
Towards the Multilateralization of International Investment Law, 10 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 865, 874-
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measures has had a dramatic effect on the legal regime pertaining to foreign
direct investment (FDI). The measures changed the balance of power between
host countries and foreign investors in favor of the latter. The measures have
also been tremendously successful. They have been widely adopted, as noted
above, and have also proven fairly resilient. While there is a certain degree of
variation among BITs in the exact content and language of these measures,
BITs tend to be similar in their substantive content and structure-virtually
every BIT is premised on these three principles.'6 The more recent trend of BIT
renegotiation mostly aims to rephrase their language in light of a growing body
of arbitral awards rather than to replace any of the three principles with
anything substantively different.' 7
Vandevelde offers a slightly different historical account of BITs, which
we find instructive. With regard to the post-World War II period, Vandevelde's
account is largely in line with the conventional wisdom. However, he begins
his analysis at an earlier point in time-specifically, in the Colonial Era,
beginning in the late eighteenth century. In this era, countries signed broad
treaties on friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCNs), in which investment
protection was only one issue and not necessarily the primary one. The
protection afforded to foreign investment was weak, as it relied on espousal,
that is, the foreign investor's home country espousing the investor's grievance
and addressing it through diplomatic channels or with military force. Quite
obviously, this was an ineffective approach, as its actual implementation
depended on the home- and host-countries' respective political agendas and
military might, the investor's political leverage at home, and the scope of the
investment, which had to be substantial to justify putting such an apparatus in
motion. Against this backdrop, the three new elements that BITs introduced are
best understood as means of creating a more effective regime of international
investment protection.
FCNs, however, preceded the BIT movement in at least one important
aspect essential to this Article. According to Vandevelde, "The post-war FCNs
guaranteed 'equitable treatment' and the 'most constant protection and
security' to property of foreign nationals and companies. Such property could
not be taken without payment of just compensation."l 9 The "fair and equitable"
standard-which is adopted by the vast majority of BITs as the primary
standard for appropriate investment protection20--traCS its roots, according to
76 (2009).
16. See Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An Overview, in
EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 3, at xxvii, xxxvii.
17. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT RULE-MAKING:
STOCKTAKING, CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD, at 25, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2007/3,
U.N. Sales No. E.08.1I.D.1 (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20073_en.pdf ("One
major reason for these efforts is the wish of the contracting parties to update 'old' treaties by including
'modern' protection standards, such as those relating to national treatment and investor-State dispute
settlement. In some cases, however, the contracting parties' intention is to clarify treaty provisions and
to reassess the actual balancing of private and public interests in HAs.").
18. Vandevelde, supra note 12, at 158-61.
19. Id. at 163 (footnotes omitted).
20. See Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT & TRADE 357, 359 (2005). For a thorough review, see U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev.,
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several commentators, to the 1948 Havana Charter for an International Trade
Organization.21 Article 11(2) of the Charter contemplated that foreign
investments should be assured "just and equitable treatment."22 Recently,
however, a note by Kill argues that this concept dates further back to the 1919
League of Nations Covenant. 2 3 Identifying the lineage of this basic standard of
treatment for foreign investment is important, as it underscores the fact that this
standard is not just a technical term, but rather invokes very basic notions of
propriety held by the framers of this regime. We return to this point below.24
The history of BITs would not be complete if one considered
nationalizations and expropriations merely as a series of isolated episodes in
which host countries repudiated the property rights of foreign investors. There
was logic-indeed, an ideology-in this movement. Following on the heels of
the postcolonization stage, developing and socialist countries promoted a
political platform that recognized a right to expropriate foreign assets. In two
famous declaratory statements, the General Assembly of the United Nations in
1974 held that state sovereignty includes "the right to nationalization or transfer
of ownership to its nationals" 25 and, shortly thereafter, the right "to nationalize,
expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate
compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures."26 In
conjunction with the prohibition on the use of force to collect debts or protect
investment entailed by the United Nations Charter, this policy pushed
developed countries to seek alternative mechanisms to protect their
27investments-to wit, bilateral investment treaties. As Vandevelde notes:
BITs were negotiated principally between a developed and a developing
country... . Typically, the agreement was drafted by the developed country and
offered to the developing country for signature, with the final agreement
Fair and Equitable Treatment, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/1 I (Vol. III) (1999). For additional studies
dealing with the fair and equitable criterion see also IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (2008); Bamali
Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and Equitable Treatment in International
Investment Law, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 297 (2005); Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable
Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, 39 INT'L LAW. 87 (2005); Stephen Vasciannie, The
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice, 70 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 99 (1999); Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International
Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A CHANGING LANDSCAPE 73 (Org. for Econ.
Co-operation & Dev. ed., 2005); Theodore Kill, Note, Don't Cross the Streams: Past and Present
Overstatement of Customary International Law in Connection with Conventional Fair and Equitable
Treatment Obligations, 106 MICH. L. REv. 853 (2008); Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable
Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law (Inst. Int'l L. & Just.,
Working Paper No. 2006/6, 2006), available at http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2006-6-
GAL-Schill-web.pdf.
21. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, 62 U.N.T.S. 26.
22. Id art. 29(2).
23. Kill, supra note 20, at 870 (noting that Article 23(e) of the Covenant calls on its members
"to secure and maintain ... equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League").
24. See infra text accompanying notes 65-66.
25. Vandevelde, supra note 12, at 167-68 (citing Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. I U.N.
Doc. A/RES/3201 (May 1, 1974)).
26. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (Dec. 12, 1974).
27. Vandevelde, supra note 12, at 168-69.
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reflecting only minor changes from the original draft. This persistent pattern
added an ideological dimension to the agreements. 28
Realpolitik thus defeated hoch Politik. The need for capital, which could
come only from rich countries, overcame developing countries' desire to assert
their independence and distance themselves from their former colonizers.
Dependencia-the battle cry of Latin American countries against dependency
on the North-was abandoned.2 9 The BITs movement subsequently broadened
to include all types of country pairs, but the overriding ideology-namely, that
property must be protected-has not changed and has only become more
ingrained. In the final stage, in the 1990s and 2000s some leading capital-
exporting countries-including the United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, Germany, and Switzerland-solidified their control over the terms of
engagement in international investment, each introducing their own version of
a "model BIT," i.e., a standardized document aimed at setting up the content of
all the dyadic BITs to which this country would be a party. 30
C. What BITs Do: Theory and Evidence
The question of what BITs do should have a straightforward answer in
light of the preceding paragraphs: they facilitate international investment. A
closer analysis reveals a more complex situation, however. In this Section we
briefly deal with three distinct issues. First, what is the mechanism that BITs
implement? Second, what effect should this mechanism bring about? Third, do
BITs live up to this promise? As we will see, only the first question has a
relatively clear answer.
As already noted, BITs have a fairly standard structure. By intention,
BITs focus on international investment. They do not usually deal with other
aspects of international relations, unlike their FCN predecessors, or even with
other aspects of international economic relations, such as trade.3 1 According to
a U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) study,
28. Id. at 170-71.
29. Dependencia refers to a quasi-Marxist political economy school of thought that was
prominent mostly in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. It holds that the global capitalism of the
metropolitan centers of the developed world-the North-were responsible for the depletion of
resources and economic underdevelopment in the South. The logical consequence was intense,
principled rejection of foreign investment by multinational corporations. See generally Richard R.
Fagen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Market: Thoughts on Extending Dependency Ideas,
32 INT'L ORG. 287 (1978); Gabriel Palma, Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a
Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?, 6 WORLD DEV. 881 (1978).
For an application to Africa, see, for example, WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED
AFRICA (1972). For an explanation in the context of BITs, see Jason Webb Yackee, Are BITS Such a
Bright Idea? Exploring the Ideational Basis ofInvestment Treaty Enthusiasm, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 195, 209 (2005).
30. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW: UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS (2008) (offering scattered analyses of
model BIT provisions).
31. See Sachs & Sauvant, supra note 16, at xxxvii. A different category of international
agreements-namely, preferential trade and investment agreements (PTIAs) and economic integration
agreements-may also deal with investment. For example, Chapter II of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) implements an international investment regime largely similar to the regime
that BITs implement. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 1, at 61-75.
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[BITs'] main provisions typically deal with the scope and definition of foreign
investment . . . ; admission of investments; national and most-favored-nation
treatment; fair and equitable treatment; guarantees and compensation in respect
of expropriation and compensation for war and civil disturbances; guarantees of
free transfer of funds and repatriation of capital and profits; subrogation on
insurance claims; and dispute-settlement provisions, both State-to-State and
investor-to-State... . [These] basic features of BITs, including their objectives,
format and broad underlying principles, have changed little over the years. 3 2
Model BITs enhance this uniformity of the general structure even further,
notwithstanding considerable variability in the details and language of
particular BITs.
Scholarly theories pertaining to BITs began to appear only in the 1970s
under the shadow of the dependencia ideology, developing countries' hostility
toward multinational corporations (MNCs), and a track record of
nationalizations, especially in extractive industries. It was under these
conditions that the preeminent scholar Raymond Vernon in 1971 advanced the
obsolescing bargain theory (OBT). Because host countries lacked the financial
resources and technological ability to locate, develop, and market their natural
resources, they found it necessary to accept the terms required by foreign
MNCs as a condition for developing such extractive projects. Once a bargain
was struck, however, Vernon predicted that the conditions underlying the initial
host government-MNC bargain would deteriorate-that is, the bargain would
"obsolesce." 33 With the large capital investment now largely sunk, MNCs
would be vulnerable to demands to adjust the terms of investment, to "creeping
expropriation," and eventually to wholesale nationalization. OBT's prediction
that MNCs would renegotiate the original contract on less favorable terms or
else face expropriation was backed by empirical reality during the 1970s. 34
The decline of outright expropriations in the late 1970s, followed by the
debt crisis of developing countries in the 1980s and subsequently the collapse
of the Soviet Bloc in 1989, have pushed OBT to the margins. A new neo-liberal
policy has been advanced by international financial institutions, including the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These organizations have
focused on implementing market-oriented structural reforms within developing
countries-in particular, the protection of property rights-as a condition for
aid. As a corollary, the attitude toward FDI has changed from hostility to
hospitality. In due course, U.N. institutions such as UNCTAD, which in the
past exhibited suspicion toward MNCs, also changed their tone to be more
MNC-favorable. The ascendancy of neo-liberalism coincides with the surge in
the signing of BITs from a handful a year to several dozen a year. The
structuralist view of FDI, which focuses on the domestic institutional structure
32. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, at 20, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000).
33. RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S.
ENTERPRISES 47-53 (1971); see also THEODORE H. MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE
POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE: COPPER IN CHILE (1974) (providing a detailed account of Chilean
nationalization of copper mining assets developed by foreign finns).
34. Stephen J. Kobrin, Expropriation as an Attempt To Control Foreign Firms in LDCs:
Trends from 1960 to 1979, 28 INT'L STUD. Q. 329, 329-30 (1984).
124
BITs and Pieces of Property
of host countries, thus points out that host countries have less incentive and
ability to renegotiate bargains in the present era than they had in the 1970s.35
Such a view thus would predict the growing number of BITs to which host
countries have become party.
It should be emphasized, however, that the structuralist approach does not
negate OBT. In both views, host countries are bedeviled by their own
rationality. In a standard rational expectations model, it is imperative for the
host country and its leaders to act opportunistically and renege on the contract
with the foreign investor. Furthermore, both theories share the new institutional
economics' insight that institutions matter.36 That is, in order to prevent the
collapse of investment contracts, there needs to be a mechanism that will
enable the host country to make a credible commitment (as opposed to a
contractual undertaking, which, without more, may be inherently noncredible)
not to expropriate the investment, either fully or partially. Even when
wholesale expropriations have become a rarity-though definitely not
extinct -_policy changes and government intervention remain a significant
38source of political risk. Such risk could materialize from seemingly innocuous
legal or regulatory measures that cause a "death of a thousand cuts."39
In recent years, much attention has thus been paid to identifying and
improving developing countries' domestic institutions, including the legal and
regulatory environment, institutional strength, anticorruption measures, and
crime reduction-often broadly referred to as "governance" or "the rule of
law."40 UNCTAD recently stated that "policy and institutional determinants are
especially important in developing countries, which are often characterized by
weaker institutions and less consistent policies than developed countries."41
BITs provide another such mechanism for dispelling the uncertainty that
foreign investors face. BITs constrain the incentive to expropriate through a
35. See Lorraine Eden, Stefanie Lenway & Douglas A. Schuler, From the Obsolescing
Bargain to the Political Bargaining Model, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT
RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 251 (Robert Grosse ed., 2005).
36. The image of Ulysses tying himself to the ship's mast so as not to heed the Sirens' call
immediately comes to mind. On commitment mechanisms in general, see Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government Commitment, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A
CHANGING SOCIETY 245 (Pierre Bourdieu & James S. Coleman eds., 1991). On the centrality of
institutions as commitment mechanisms, see Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and
Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,
49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 808 (1989). On institutional commitment mechanisms in international.
investment, see Witold J. Henisz, The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment, 16 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 334 (2000); and Witold J. Henisz & Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic
Organization- Within and Between Countries, 1 BUS. & POL. 261 (1999).
37. See supra note 14.
38. See generally EDWARD M. GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL
GOVERNMENTS (1996); NATHAN M. JENSEN, NATION-STATES AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION
(2006).
39. Jo Jakobsen, Does Democracy Moderate the Obsolescing Bargain Mechanism?-An
Empirical Analysis 1983-2001, TRANSNAT'L CORP., Dec. 2006, at 67, 71.
40. See Governance and Anti-Corruption, WORLD BANK, http://vww.worldbank.org/wbi/
governance (last visited Nov. 7, 2010), for links to research and publications focusing on governance
and anticorruption.
41. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 1, at 12-13.
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commitment to pay fair compensation, and they make this commitment
credible by subjecting the host country to external, impartial arbitration. The
latter element of surrendering sovereignty is the linchpin of the entire
mechanism, as it erodes the host country's power over the foreign investor.43
To cite UNCTAD again:
[A]nother reason for concluding [BITs] is that home countries may have doubts
about the institutional quality in the host country; that is, the quality of
domestic institutions protecting property rights and resolving disputes. [BITs],
by placing dispute resolution outside the domestic system of host countries,
may thus substitute for poor institutional quality."
BITs thus "may contribute to the coherence, transparency, predictability and
stability of the investment frameworks of host countries." 45
Do BITs work as advertised? That is, do BITs effectively engender higher
flows of FDI between country pairs that have a BIT? This is an empirical
question, to which the answer appears to be affirmative, though not decisively
so. Studies that have looked into this question have improved in terms of
methodology such that the more recent ones deserve more attention. An early
study by UNCTAD examining BITs through the mid-1990s found a weak
positive relationship between the number of BITs to which a country is party
and FDI inflows. That study already conjectured about the additional
importance of the domestic institutional environment. However, studies from
the early 2000s failed to find a robust significant correlation between BITs and
FDI. Hallward-Driemeier found that BITs do not serve to attract additional FDI
but may act more as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, good
institutional quality and local property rights.4 7 Likewise, Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman argue that the number of BITs seems to have little impact on a
country's ability to attract FDI, though it may positively impact investment in
already-attractive countries.48
42. Other typical provisions in BITs, such as a commitment not to hinder repatriation of funds,
serve a similar objective.
43. Ramamurti thus distinguishes two "tiers" of country-investor interactions. In tier one,
international organizations establish broad sets of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that
constrain tier-two interactions between MNCs and host countries. BITs belong in tier one. See Ravi
Ramamurti, The Obsolescing 'Bargaining Model'? MNC-Host Developing Country Relations Revisited,
32 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 23 (2001).
44. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEv., supra note 1, at 16-17; see also Tom Ginsburg,
International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance, 25
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 107 (2005).
45. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 1, at 25. For an alternative theory of
BITs as a commitment mechanism that focuses on cross-country competition to provide credible
property rights protections required by direct investors, see Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth
A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60
INT'L ORG. 811 (2006); and Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining
the Popularity ofBilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998).
46. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-
1990s, at 104-122 (1998).
47. Hallward-Driemeier, supra note 3.
48. Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business
Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties (Yale Law Sch. Ctr.
for Law, Econ. & Pub. Pol'y, Research Paper No. 293, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-
557121.
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After these studies, there appeared a series of studies that found positive
links between BITs and FDI. Some of the studies claimed to be causal, finding
that having BITs actually increases FDI. Salacuse and Sullivan show that a host
country that has concluded a BIT with the United States is more likely to
increase its overall FDI among all Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries than a country without such a BIT.4 9 Egger
and Pfaffermayr assert that BITs exert a positive effect on outward FDI of
home countries to BIT partner host countries if the treaties are actually
implemented, with a weaker effect for signing a treaty.50 Grosse and Trevino
report that FDI inflows were positively related to a greater number of BITs
signed by Central and Eastern European countries, which they see as part of
general institutional building.5 According to Neumayer and Spess, developing
countries that sign more BITs with developed countries receive more FDI-an
impact that was sometimes conditional on institutional quality (i.e., rule of law,
absence of corruption, etc.). 52 Biithe and Milner find a positive correlation
between BITs and subsequent inward FDI into developing countries. Yet these
authors emphasize that although BITs are not required for attracting FDI, the
competitive dynamic "may mean that retaining the status quo of no or few BITs
might become increasingly costly over time." 53 In another study examining the
signaling effects of BITs, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman conclude that the number
of BITs a host country signs with high-income countries has a positive effect
on FDI inflows, but that the increased popularity of BITs means that each extra
BIT has a decreasing effect on inflows of FDI to the country that is party to the
BITs.54 Additional studies report findings in a similar vein.
A few recent studies cast some doubt on this apparent consensus,
however. In a reexamination of Neumayer and Spess's study, Yackee finds that
the statistical relation of BITs and FDI is weaker than those found by the
study's authors, holds mostly for low-risk countries in opposition to theory, and
in some cases is nonsignificant. Yackee further shows an opposite conditional
relationship with domestic institutional quality than that found by Neumayer
and Spess. In a separate study, Yackee finds no direct correlation between
49. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 12, at 111.
50. Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on
Foreign Direct Investment, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 788 (2004).
51. Robert Grosse & Len J. Trevino, New Institutional Economics and FDI Location in
Central and Eastern Europe, 45 MGMT. INT'L REV. 123 (2005).
52. Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct
Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567 (2005).
53. Tim Bitthe & Helen V. Milner, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct
Investment: A Political Analysis, in EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note
3, at 171, 214.
54. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 3 (manuscript at 23).
55. See Peter Egger & Valeria Merlo, The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on FDI
Dynamics, 30 WORLD ECON. 1536 (2007); Kevin P. Gallagher & Melissa B.L. Birch, Do Investment
Agreements Attract Investment? Evidence from Latin America, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 961 (2006);
Kim Sokchea, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Political Risk and Foreign Direct Investment, 11 ASIA
PAC. J. ECON. & BuS. 6 (2007); Busse et al., supra note 3.
56. Jason Yackee, Do BITs Really Work? Revisiting the Empirical Link between Investment
Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment, in EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,
supra note 3, at 379.
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investment decisions and BITs that afford increased legal protection in their
international arbitration clauses. Yackee interprets these results to suggest that
the case for formal (international) law may have been overstated and that
noncontractual, informal obligations may be more important.s Aisbett
replicates the strong positive correlation between BIT ratification and FDI
inflows, but upon controlling for endogeneity, this relation becomes
nonsignificant, suggesting that this relation is not driven by an effect from
BITs. 58
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES OF BITS: TOWARD A PROPERTY
PARADIGM?
A. From "Investment" to "Property"
As Part II demonstrated, the chief institutional design principles behind
the development of BITs as a cross-border legal mechanism were the reduction
of uncertainty about property rights on the part of foreign investors and the
enhancement of credibility of states' commitments to preserve foreign
investors' legal rights. BITs were engineered to attain both of these goals
through formal treaty recognition of investors' rights and the subjection of
states' corresponding commitments to impartial international adjudication.
As mentioned, BITs were originally intended to support certain
paradigmatic economic forms of foreign investment and to protect investors'
rights from potential infringements by host countries. The paradigmatic rights
infringement focused on instances such as blunt measures of expropriation or
nationalization of foreign investments; overt or covert regulatory discrimination
against foreigners; allegedly neutral yet sweeping adverse regulation that
severely impacts the present and future value of investments; and infringement
of contracts for the provision of goods or services that had been signed directly
between foreign investors and host governments. BITs, providing for both
specific investment protection commitments and "umbrella clauses,"59 were
aimed at preventing or remedying these types of government conduct.
However, the economic and legal paradigms have been changing. These
transformations confront BITs and similar cross-border treaties with new
challenges that bring into question the extent to which these instruments can
57. Jason Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of
(International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 805 (2008).
58. Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation
Versus Causation, in EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 3, at 395.
59. Many BITs include a provision by which "each Contracting Party shall observe any other
obligation it has assumed with regard to investments by nationals or companies of the other Contracting
Party in its territory." This provision is regularly referred to as an "umbrella clause" because it creates "a
separate obligation under the investment treaty, requiring the Contracting Parties to observe obligations
the host State has assumed in its relations with nationals of the other Contracting Party." Stephan W.
Schill, Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of Umbrella Clauses in International
Investment Treaties, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2009). The application of umbrella clauses has recently
turned into a major point of contention, with differing opinions among tribunals, policymakers, and
commentators about the function and scope of the clause-for example, whether it covers commercial
obligations by states or only sovereign modes of conduct such as legislation, regulation, or the grant of
licenses. Id. at 5-7.
128
BITs and Pieces ofProperty
fulfill their institutional role.
From an economic-financial perspective, foreign investments have
boomed in recent decades, 0 with traffic going not only from West to East or
North to South, but also coming in from what were once considered developing
economies. But the changing landscape of foreign investment is not only
quantitative but also qualitative. Consider the example of real estate: whereas
in the past foreign investors sought to acquire land mainly to set up a specific
predesignated project (e.g., a subsidiary manufacturing plant) and were thus
considered a relatively isolated phenomenon in the local landscape, foreign
investors are increasingly entering real estate markets as regular actors, often
purchasing land for investment or real estate entrepreneurship in a way that is
indistinguishable from domestic actors' investment.62 This phenomenon is even
more abundant for foreign shareholding and equity participation in local
businesses and firms, not only through mergers and acquisitions,63 but also
through portfolio investments, which are generally understood to fall within the
definition of "investment" in BITs.64 Thus, for nearly all states and purposes,
foreign investors are currently part and parcel of local economies.
At the same time, foreign investors still look to BITs as potentially
granting them a beneficial lex specialis. Thus, whereas "national treatment"
clauses are designed to put foreign investors on equal footing with domestic
actors, the "fair and equitable treatment" standard was explicitly developed as
an international norm, separate from domestic laws. 65 This term is vague, and
adjudicating tribunals consistently struggle to interpret it whenever foreign
investors claim that an otherwise nondiscriminatory government measure
66
nevertheless fails to meet the "fair and equitable treatment" standard. Thus,
the very idea behind this legal term unveils a tension between the economic
60. See, e.g., Jason Bush, The Russian Towers Are Coming, Bus. WK., Oct. 9, 2006, at 60;
Jason Bush, Ukraine: What Crisis?, BUS. WK., Sept. 3, 2007, at 50; Roben Farzad, Extreme Investing:
Inside Colombia, BUS. WK., May 28, 2007, at 50; FDI in Chinese Real Estate Soared, CHINA
CHEMICAL REP., July 6, 2007, at 4; Erik Heinrich, The Next Real Estate Boom, CAN. Bus., Mar. 26,
2007, at 25-27; Andrew Morse, Tokyo Property Lures Goldman, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2007, at A4.
61. See Steven R. Weisman, A Fear ofForeign Investments, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at Cl
(describing growing fears in the United States over multi-billion dollar foreign investments coming from
sovereign wealth funds in China, Russia, and Persian Gulf countries, and quoting American officials'
concerns that these funds are politically involved and have nontransparent investment policies).
62. See, e.g., Bush, Ukraine: What Crisis?, supra note 60, at 50-51 (reporting a sixty percent
price increase in one year in Kiev's real estate market following the foreign investment boom, and
describing how powerful entrepreneurs quickly push forward projects in what is otherwise a
bureaucracy-laden state).
63. For a current analysis of cross-border mergers and acquisitions figures and trends, see
U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations Agricultural
Production and Development, at 42-71, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2009 (2009), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2009_en.pdf.
64. Id. at 35-36.
65. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on
Investment Rulemaking, at 40-51, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3 (2007), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20073_en.pdf
66. See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on
Liability, 131 (Oct. 3, 2006) (holding that "the fair and equitable standard consists of the host State's
consistent and transparent behavior, free of ambiguity that involves the obligation to grant and maintain
a stable and predictable legal framework necessary to fulfill the justified expectations of the foreign
investor").
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globalization of local markets, on the one hand, and the now-reverse potential
legal differentiation in favor of foreign investors by allegedly granting them an
additional source of protection against government regulation that local
investors do not enjoy.
Beyond this general challenge to the legal ordering of foreign investment,
we identify in this Article another prominent phenomenon in the legal context
of BITs. We argue that the evolving common understanding and interpretation
of key treaty terms such as "investment," "rights," "protection," or
"expropriation" increasingly tilt these international mechanisms toward a
general "property discourse." Investors often look beyond host governments'
public commitments or contractual obligations to ensure broader protection of
their "property rights" through BITs.
This is especially so since the term "investment" is typically defined in
BITs as comprising a list of rights in assets that effectively encompass the
entire range of objects of property rights: immovable, moveable, and intangible
property; intellectual property; shares, stocks, futures, options, and other
derivatives; licenses and permits; related property rights such as leases,
mortgages, liens, and pledges; and, in some cases, even claims to debts. 67
Investors seek to have these rights to assets protected against all types of third
parties, including domestic private actors that have a conflicting claim to the
assets. In so doing, foreign investors turn not only to local property doctrines in
the host country but also to BITs to protect their property rights more broadly.
In this sense, investors aspire to be shielded by a kind of property lex specialis
that would bind not only the host government but also other private actors that
may have rival contentions to rights in these assets.
The property rights terminology and rhetoric uttered by investors has not
fallen on deaf ears among tribunals dealing with BIT disputes. In a growing
number of arbitral judgments, tribunals refer to investors' rights in the types of
assets that are included in the definition of "investment" as "property rights"
and treat them as such for purposes of examining the issue of "expropriation"
or other potential infringements.68
Accordingly, tribunals frequently interpret treaty terms such as
"expropriation" and "indirect expropriation" in a way that increasingly
resembles the respective "takings" and "regulatory takings" doctrines in the
United States.69 Tribunals interpreting BITs have also drawn inspiration from
67. For examples of "investment" definitions in recent BITs, see U.N. Conference on Trade &
Dev., supra note 65, at 72-74; Treaty Between the United States of America and the Government of
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art. I [hereinafter
U.S. Model BIT], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf; Agreement
Between Canada and - for the Promotion and Protection of Interests, art. I [hereinafter
Canadian Model BIT], available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/files/CanadaModel _BIT.pdf See also
infra text accompanying notes 196-198 for further discussion of specific BITs.
68. See, e.g., S. Pac. Props. (Middle E.) Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Award on
the Merits, I 160-68 (May 20, 1992), 32 I.L.M. 933, 967-69 (1993); Plama Consortium Ltd. v.
Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 128 (Feb. 8, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 721,
740 (2005).
69. See, e.g., Mexico v. Metalclad Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Judicial Review, TIT
102-12 (May 2, 2001), 5 ICSID Rep. 236 (2001) (describing "indirect expropriation" as depriving the
owner of a "reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit," thus using language similar to the
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the jurisprudence of the "right to property" clauses in other supranational
documents, such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) 70
and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.71 Notably, the concept
of proportionality, which is a keystone of the property jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, has
increasingly influenced the analysis of arbitral tribunals deciding whether a
host country has violated its BIT commitments by taking measures that
adversely affect investments. 72
In some cases, references to property terminology and jurisprudence are
explicit in the BIT itself. The 2004 U.S. model BIT defines whether an indirect
expropriation has occurred 73 based almost verbatim on the three-prong test for
regulatory takings developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City ofNew York.74 The U.S. model BIT refers to "(i) the
economic impact of the government action . . . ; (ii) the extent to which the
government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed
expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action."" The 2004
76Canadian model BIT uses similar language.
On its face, there seems to be nothing wrong with the movement of
international investment jurisprudence toward a property discourse. To the
extent that "constitutionalization" is gradually becoming a legitimate concept in
international economic treaty law, since it allegedly reflects a credible
commitment by countries to place external restraints on their sovereign
powers,77 property jurisprudence seems like an ideal candidate for defining the
scope of protection for investments against potential infringements of BITs by
signatory countries. Since nearly all countries have a property clause in their
domestic constitutions, the terminology and methodology of property
discourse may allegedly aid both investors and countries in building
"reasonable expectation" notion advanced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978)); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)/00/3, Award, 1 155 (Apr. 30, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967, 998 (2004) (referring explicitly to the
term "regulatory taking" as typifying inquiries about indirect expropriation, while holding that the
concept is not relevant in the present case).
70. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Protocol to the European Convention on
Human Rights].
71. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
72. See, e.g., Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, T 122 (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133, 164 (2007) (discussing the
"proportionality" test and referring to this doctrine in a number of cases decided by the European Court
of Human Rights).
73. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 67, at Annex B.
74. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
75. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 67, at Annex B, § 4.
76. Canadian Model BIT, supra note 67, at Annex B.13(l).
77. Peter Behrens, Towards the Constitutionalization of International Investment Protection,
45 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS [ARCHIVE PUB. INT'L L.] 153 (2007).
78. See generally A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES (1999)
(collecting 104 property clauses in constitutions worldwide).
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expectations, clearing up ambiguities, and promoting goals of certainty and
credibility.
However, we argue that the notion of property is significantly more
complex than first meets the eye. By extension, property rights and the
protection thereof under a BIT regime may also become complex and
uncertain, thereby actually undermining the original institutional design goals
of BITs. Part IV elaborates on what we refer to as the intricacies of BIT
property protection, pointing to heterogeneity as a central notion that makes
difficult the transfer of the property discourse from a locally based
jurisprudence to an overarching universal design concept that could govern the
scope and content of BITs.
But before we address the different aspects of heterogeneity in the context
of BIT property protection, it is essential more generally to explain the traits of
property jurisprudence, especially the complex public/private interplay in
property. These insights will lay the foundations for the discussion of BITs and
property rights.
B. The Dual Nature of Property Rights
The embrace of property terminology to define the nature and scope of
foreign investors' rights under BITs carries potentially significant
jurisprudential implications. To understand why this is the case, this Section
will briefly articulate in Subsection 1 the unique traits of property rights, as
compared with contractual or obligatory ones. It will demonstrate that even
when a property discourse is initially designed with a "public" viewpoint in
mind-i.e., protecting a right holder's direct relationships vis-A-vis the
government-such a design is bound to influence, and be influenced by, the
"private" aspect of property law-i.e. the right holder's relationships with other
potential right holders. As we then show in Subsection 2, this is the case not
only in the interrelationship between public-constitutional law and private law
in domestic property systems, but also in supranational mechanisms and
institutions. This means that the growing tendency toward a BIT property
discourse will have broader implications than originally anticipated, leading to
a complicated tension between BIT (international) property law, domestic
property law, and other sources of law on either the local or supranational level,
as well as to a "horizontal" tension between property provisions in different
BITs that apply to assets within the same host country.
1. The Structure ofDomestic Property Law
Property law sets out the ways in which society allocates, governs, and
enforces entitlements and obligations in resources and the human relationships
around them.79 Property regimes and the property rights that emanate from
them are at their base the result of conscious decisions by states' authorized
entities-in the case of a domestic property system-to designate resources as
79. Amnon Lehavi, Mixing Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 137, 211 (2008).
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objects of property and to create a certain set of entitlements and obligations in
them.80 The basic structure of property law therefore implicates not only the
state/citizen relationship, but also the basic tenets of property relations among
different private persons.
In this sense, one should not attribute "publicness" only to property
relations between an individual and the state or to property rules stemming
from broad-based constitutional provisions. Core issues in property also
implicate decisionmakers' institutional processes and substantive reasoning in
matters of resource control among nonstate parties. ' To illustrate the ways in
which state-based acts may alter otherwise "regular" property relations among
private actors, consider, for example, statutes authorizing certain corporations,
such as common carriers and public utilities, to nonconsensually assemble
lands or rights-of-way in them;82 laws governing the involuntary private
transfer of lands through adverse possession; or laws limiting property owners
from exercising an otherwise legally recognizable right of exclusion, such as
statutes prohibiting discrimination against prospective tenants or patrons on
certain grounds. 84
Property entitlements and obligations regarding both specific assets and
more general categories of resources (land, chattels, intellectual property, etc.)
regularly implicate numerous parties not only abstractly, but also in social and
economic practice. In this sense, property differs qualitatively from the design
of legal regimes for contractual or obligatory rights.
Parties to contracts may differ from one another in power, size, and so
forth, but they are, at least initially, identifiable voluntary parties that share
some agreed-upon goals as provided for in the contract, even if disputes may
later arise. In contrast, the parties affected by a property right may not have
any sort of privity or voluntary relationship among them, and are often
complete strangers that find themselves ex post facto entangled in a clash over
competing claims regarding the same asset. Beyond the fact that such parties
are usually not enumerated and identifiable to one another in advance, they are
also likely to be much more heterogeneous as a group of rights-bearers in their
epistemological, cultural, and social attributes.
Therefore, the challenge faced by legal systems in designing property
80. See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 202-03 (1997).
81. Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987, 2004-07 (2008).
82. Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1704, 1710-
11 (2007).
83. See generally THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 194-220 (2007).
84. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 376-84 (6th ed. 2006).
85. Lehavi, supra note 81, at 2004-07.
86. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) ("[C]ontract law should facilitate the efforts of contracting parties to
maximize the joint gains (the 'contractual surplus') from transactions . . . . [C]ontract law should do
nothing else"); id. at 557 ("A contract has an intertemporal aspect: Parties agree today to do something
tomorrow.").
87. Amnon Lehavi, The Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Standards,
RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 7-8) (on file with authors).
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regimes is one of simultaneously delineating the borders of permissible-versus-
impermissible government intervention with property rights, while at the same
time defining the scope and nature of property rights vis-A-vis the entire
spectrum of third parties. This duality vividly demonstrates the distinctive
nature of property as a basis for in rem rights.
Accordingly, we argue that legal rules controlling governmental
interventions with private property are not and cannot be hermetically sealed
off from the private law of property. To be sure, the interface between the
private and public realms in property is highly intricate and defies clear
demarcation, and we certainly do not argue that the law of governmental
intervention with property should necessarily aspire for harmony with the law
governing property relations among private parties in every doctrinal issue.89
However, it would be safe to say, for example, that the law of takings-or
"expropriation," to use the BIT terminology-does have bearing on the way in
which the different actors would broadly understand property entitlements and
obligations in the private realm.
Examples of such ties between the public and private aspects of property
in domestic legal systems are abundant, although every legal system creates its
own type of interrelationship based on broad jurisprudential and normative
considerations. For example, the public and legal outrage over the U.S.
Supreme Court's Kelo v. City of New London decision was vividly presaged in
Justice O'Connor's assertion in her dissent that "[n]othing is to prevent the
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a
shopping mall, or any farm with a factory."9o Justice O'Connor expressed a
deep concern that the overbroad construction of "public use" to facilitate a
condemn-and-transfer practice for economic development was not only a
matter of governmental abuse, but one that may also undermine the
fundamental understanding of what it means to be a property owner, including
vis-A-vis other persons.91 In a number of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has
made explicit cross-references between the public law and private law of
property. This has occurred, for example, in takings cases, in which the Court
considered the power to exclude as "one of the most treasured strands in an
owner's bundle of property rights,"92 and similarly viewed rights of possession,
control, and disposition as "valuable rights that inhere in the property" 93 -
thereby referring to the private, common-law jurisprudence of property rights.94
It should be noted, however, that the demarcation of the public/private
88. Lehavi, supra note 81, at 2000-12.
89. Id. at 2017-18.
90. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1849, 1879-84 (2007) (portraying a Kelo-type condemn-and-transfer use of the eminent
domain power as contradicting popular conceptions about the overall morality of property rights).
92. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
93. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998).
94. See, e.g., College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 673 (1999) (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1988) (deciding a
trademark law dispute)).
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interface is far from clear or consistent in American jurisprudence. A prominent
example concerns the famous Shelley v. Kraemer case, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated a restrictive covenant signed and recorded by thirty
property owners in a neighborhood in St. Louis that provided that the properties
would be leased or sold to whites only.9 5 The Supreme Court of Missouri,
based on common law property principles, upheld the restrictive covenant.96
The constitutional anchor that enabled the U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate
this measure as an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause97 was to view the state judicial decrees upholding the
restrictive covenants as constituting "state action."98 In other words, according
to the Court, by rendering a judgment upholding the covenant and employing
the "full coercive power of government to deny the petitioners, on the grounds
of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners
are willing and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to
sell," the state court's decision had implicated, and violated, the Equal
Protection Clause. 99
By viewing judicial rulings in private law settings as "state action" that
consequently implicate the Bill of Rights, the Court's decision in Shelley could
have led to fuller-scale osmosis of public and private in property, including for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.' 00 If all private dealings
that are litigated by the judicial system are viewed as implicating "state action"
attributed to the court, then practically the entire field of property law becomes
"constitutionalized." This has not happened to date, likely because the Supreme
Court wishes to maintain a sphere of private activity that is not subject to
constitutional scrutiny, even if the borders between "private" and "public" are
often blurry and ambiguous.' 0' In developing its takings jurisprudence, the
95. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948).
96. Id. at 19-20.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
98. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 14-16. Reasoning that "the action of state courts and judicial officers
... is to be regarded as an action of the State," the Court concluded that
in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States
have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws....
. . . We have noted that freedom from discrimination by the States in the enjoyment of
property rights was among the basic objectives sought to be effectuated by the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 15, 20.
99. Id. at 19.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 4.
101. For a description of the aftermath of Shelley, in which the Court effectively narrowed the
ruling to the specific facts of the case, and for a review of the literature on whether Shelley is based on
sound legal theory, see Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New
Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 451, 458-83 (2007). The issue of judicial involvement in the creation of
"private" property law also relates to some extent to the question of whether it is possible to have a
"judicial taking" in American jurisprudence, that is, if a judicial change in a common law property
doctrine may be considered a "taking" of the losing side's property rights. See, e.g., Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing this dilemma regarding a
prospective change in accretion rules); see also Burton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L.
REv. 1449 (1990). The issue of judicial takings was recently reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
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Court has refrained from subjecting the entire spectrum of property, including
common law elements, to the public realm. At the same time, however, as
discussed above, it has not opted for entirely divorcing the "private" aspect of
property from the "public" one.
Although other legal systems are different from the American one, and
some will strike a different balance in the structural and normative
interrelations between "public" and "private," we argue that the introduction of
a "property discourse" into a legal system carries major systematic
implications, which go beyond the original paradigm that may have initially
motivated such a move.
2. Implications for Supranational Property Systems
We now move to argue that the above-mentioned consequences of a
"property discourse" at the domestic level also characterize the supranational
level. Before addressing BITs, which are the focus of this Article, we take note
of the implications of introducing a constitutional-type property provision in
another prominent supranational context: Article 1 of the First Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights102 and its interpretation by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
Article 1 of the First Protocol to European Convention on Human
Rights103 has had an enormous impact on property law throughout Europe.
Since under the Convention any resident of any of the forty-four European
countries that have signed and ratified the Convention may file a claim against
his or her country, the ECHR has heard thousands of cases dealing with Article
I and has produced an extensive body of case law on the matter. In addition,
many countries have formally internalized the First Protocol's provisions in
their own laws, such as through the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act of
1998,104 so that domestic courts also constantly engage in Article 1 analysis.
The property jurisprudence of the ECHR raises the question of whether
the Court generally defers to domestic property law-aiming mainly at
guaranteeing a minimal standard of the "rule of law" within its jurisdiction'05
or whether it is poised to create supranational unified concepts and doctrines,
including in private law matters. This dilemma is illuminating for the issue of
BITs because the European Convention on Human Rights' jurisprudence
similarly deals with the interrelationship among different layers of law that
impact both the "public" and "private" spheres of property.
102. Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 70.
103. The first paragraph of Article I reads: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international
law." The second paragraph states that "the preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest. . . ." Id. art. 1.
104. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sch. 1, pt. 2, art. 1 (U.K.) (providing for the protection of
property).
105. See Tom Allen, Compensation for Property under the European Convention on Human
Rights, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 287, 292-94 (2007).
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On the one hand, the ECHR has not hesitated to intervene in domestic
property practices in matters concerning due process, such as denial of or
excessive delays in payment of compensation for full-scale expropriation.106
More substantially, the Court has also read into Article 1 principles of "fair
balance" and "proportionality" with regard to both deprivations and regulations
of property.'0 7 On the other hand, there have been cases in which the ECHR has
been more ambiguous and cautious about intervening in domestic doctrines. In
these cases, the Court has viewed the "fair balance" and "proportionality"
requirements not as a single supranational blueprint, but as standards that must
give substantial leeway to domestic rulemaking.10 8
The Court's decision in J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. United Kingdom is a
case in point because it addresses what is basically a private law dispute over
adverse possession.' 09 The ECHR's Grand Chamber, in a ten-to-seven vote,
reversed its Section 4 Chamber's ruling that the law of adverse possession of
the United Kingdom violated the Convention. 110 The Grand Chamber thus
validated the House of Lords's decision to grant judgment in favor of bad-faith
squatters who occupied privately owned and registered land.
Concisely, the case dealt with adverse possession of registered private
land that took place between 1984 and 1999, so that the applicable law was that
preceding the now-in-force Land Registration Act of 2002.112 The applicants,
the former owners who had lost their case before the national courts, including
the House of Lords, argued that the then-in-force English adverse possession
law (the Land Registration Act of 1925113) violated Article 1.114
In November 2005, the ECHR's Section 4 Chamber ruled that the case
did engage the first paragraph of Article 1, and that although English adverse
possession law may be deemed as serving a genuine public interest, the
interference with the registered owners' rights was disproportionate and thus in
violation of Article 1. In August 2007, the Grand Chamber reversed,
emphasizing the principle that, especially in complex legal matters such as land
law and housing, the Court would respect the national legislature's judgment
106. See Amnon Lehavi, The Global Law ofthe Land, 81 U. COLO. L. REv. 425, 441-47 (2010).
107. For the application of the "fair balance" principle, see Sporrong v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), 1 69 (1982) (reading the concept of "fair balance" into Article I as "inherent in the whole
of the Convention" and "reflected in the structure of Article I"). The "fair balance" and
"proportionality" principles were specifically implemented in the context of compensation for the taking
of property in James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 1 50, 54 (1986).
108. See YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 149-64 (2002).
109. J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom (JA. Pye If), App. No. 44302/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Aug. 30, 2007), available at http://echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink,
then search "Pye," then follow link to case title).
110. J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom (JA. Pye 1), App. No. 44302/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Nov. 15, 2005), available at http://echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink,
then search "Pye," then follow link to case title).
111. See JA. Pye II, App. No. 44302/02, 71-85.
112. Land Registration Act, 2002, c. 9, §§ 96-98 (Eng. & Wales).
113. Land Registration Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 21, § 75 (Eng. & Wales).
114. JA. Pye II, App. No. 44302/02,13.
115. J-A. Pye I, App. No. 44302/02, 1149-76.
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"as to what was in the general interest unless that judgment is manifestly
without reasonable foundation."1 6 The Grand Chamber noted that many of the
Convention's member states had "some form of mechanism for transferring
title in accordance with principles similar to adverse possession in the common
law systems,"'l7 but more broadly stressed that "[i]t is characteristic of property
that different countries regulate its use and transfer in a variety of ways."" 8
We will not delve into the debate over whether the J.A. Pye decision was
correct. Two issues are particularly relevant, however, for the purpose of the
present analysis.
First, the JA. Pye decision illustrates the complexity of constructing and
maintaining a property regime that involves different layers of law, especially
on the national versus supranational levels, in view of the in rem nature of
property rights. It is true that even within a national legal system, jurisdiction is
divided among different branches of government and among different types or
levels of government within the same branch, and that this fact also has bearing
on the structure of property rights. But national legal systems include a clearer
hierarchy of normative rules and decisionmaking processes, as well as
institutional mechanisms that are able to cause systematic changes and
revisions in property law, chiefly by generally applicable legislation. This
comprehensive institutional structure is largely missing in cross-national
institutions, even ones that are already well established, such as the ECHR or
the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), which oversees EU
members' compliance with EU treaties and other types of EU supranational
rulemaking.119 In deferring to the United Kingdom's domestic legislation,
"especially in complex legal matters such as land law and housing," 2 0 the
ECHR in the J.A. Pye case seems to have recognized that a property regime,
with its in rem traits and complicated cross-field effects, may be difficult to
sustain when each extra-national court or tribunal could take out a "piece of the
puzzle" and rearrange it to fit its specific mandate or interpretative tastes while
effectively ignoring all the other elements in the property regime's entire
spectrum.
Second, the J.A. Pye case illustrates the way in which Article l's property
clause is being applied not only to governmental expropriation, but also to
national laws governing deprivation of possession and other types of property
rights infringements among private persons. Thus, even when such a legal
mechanism starts out as "public," the unique dual nature of property rights may
bring about a significant conceptual spillover between the areas traditionally
classified as private or public.
It should be emphasized that the extent to which the supranational
property clause will intervene in private law disputes is not inherent or
116. JA. Pye I, App. No. 44302/02, 75.
117. Id 72.
118. Id 74.
119. See Generation Presentation-Court of Justice of the European Union, CURIA,
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_6999/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
120. J.A. Pye II, App. No.44302/02, 75.
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predetermined. The public/private interface varies among different types of
domestic property systems and between various supranational systems, and
may change even within a particular system over time.
At the same time, however, it seems almost inevitable that a "property
discourse" will have some sort of broader-based influence on the relevant
property regime, including in the private law realm. Thus, to the extent that
current and future design principles of BITs turn to a property discourse to
regulate the protection of cross-border investments, the BIT structure will have
to come to terms with the entire array of jurisprudential dilemmas that typify a
property system. We now turn to consider in detail the potential difficulties of
such BIT property protection.
IV. THE INTRICACIES OF BIT PROPERTY PROTECTION
In the preceding Parts, we reviewed the development of the BIT
movement, the theories that underlie the design of BITs as property-protecting
mechanisms, and several property law features that challenge the notion of
property in the context of BITs. We now move to conceptualize more
systematically several factors that may call into question the universal
applicability and effectiveness of the BITs regime as part of international law.
A. Cultural Heterogeneity and the Concept ofProperty
At the heart of the BIT regime lies the concept of the property, or
"investment," which is to be protected, if not by proscribing expropriation, then
at least by adequate compensation. BITs define investment exceedingly
capaciously, as Section C, infra, elaborates. But regardless of their type, BITs
assume that this investment-the protected property-belongs to the investor.
It cannot, or should not, be taken from her. This fundamental principle hides an
implicit assumption that the investor's title in the investment assets-her
ownership and entitlement-is clear and well defined. In other words, while the
investor's title may be disputable as a normative matter, such that in certain
circumstances the State may expropriate her property, her title is undisputed
(perhaps even indisputable) as a positive matter, such that all societal actors
know what belongs to whom.
This notion of well-defined and well-protected property rights is in no
way limited to BITs. In fact, it underlies the broad structural reforms promoted
by international financial institutions, sometimes referred to as "governance" or
"institutional quality," which Part II referred to in discussing the empirical
evidence about BITs and FDI.12 1 This policy derives from the new institutional
economics' insight that formalizing property rights and providing them with
effective protection through formal social (i.e., legal) institutions is essential for
a thriving market economy, while the latter is essential for economic
development. We do not intend in the present context to quarrel with new
institutional economics or with some of the policy prescriptions that have been
121. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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derived from it. We will, however, suggest that at least in the BIT context, this
line of reasoning may run into serious difficulties. In this Section, we theorize
and advance some evidence for the proposition that "property" may be
conceptualized and protected differently in different cultures.122
Property is not only a legal concept; it is also a fundamental
psychological factor. Since the time of William James, one of the founding
fathers of modem psychology, psychologists have discussed the notion of
property and how it relates to individual personality and development. More
recently, the literature refers to this concept as "psychological ownership."1 2 3
The idea is "that that there is a 'psychology of mine and property' that attaches
itself to objects."1 24 We argue that the contextual meaning of property extends
further-from the individual level to the cultural level.
Our theoretical starting point is Markus and Kitayama's seminal article,
which coined the term "construals of the self' to show that the very notion of
being a person, of a self, varies considerably across cultures.25 Western
cultures, they argue, referring primarily to North America and Western Europe,
view the mature individual as an independent entity, whereas other cultures-
mainly in Asia, Africa, and Southern and Eastern Europe-construe the self as
interdependent. The healthy independent self is defined as one that can
maintain integrity and clear boundaries across diverse social environments and
can differentiate itself from significant others as part of the maturation process.
In contrast, the interdependent self is characterized as a relational,
interconnected self with fluid boundaries. 126 Crucially, such fluidity and
contextuality of the self does not reflect instability or immaturity.127 The major
122. In conducting this analysis we adopt the standard approach to two important questions,
namely, (1) what is "culture"? and (2) whose cultures may be compared and deemed distinct? Although
the definition of culture has been subject to recurring discussions, several social sciences, including
anthropology, sociology, and psychology, generally agree that culture primarily consists of shared
values, beliefs, symbols, and norms. With regard to the second question, it is common to treat nation-
states as units of cross-cultural analysis notwithstanding the fact that cultural systems may develop in
much smaller groups. For a short introduction, see PETER B. SMITH, MICHAEL HARRIS BOND & (QIDEM
KAGITqIBASI, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ACROSS CULTURES 30-33 (3d ed. 2006).
123. For a review, see Jon L. Pierce, Tatiana Kostava & Kurt T. Dirks, The State of
Psychological Ownership: Integrating and Extending a Century ofResearch, 7 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 84
(2003).
124. Id at 84.
125. Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self Implications for
Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REV. 224 (1991). For a recent review, see Steven J.
Heine, Cultural Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1423-33 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan
T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 5th ed. 2010). See also Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama,
Cultures and Selves: A Cycle ofMutual Constitution, 5 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 420 (2010).
126. Markus and Kitayama thus integrate insights that may be traced back to Max Weber and
have prevailed in cultural and cross-cultural psychology for some time, especially with regard to
individualism versus collectivism. For major contributions, see GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S
CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS
NATIONS (2d ed. 2001); and HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM (1995). For
further elaboration on differences within Westem cultures, see Shalom H. Schwartz & Maria Ros,
Values in the West: A Theoretical and Empirical Challenge to the Individualism-Collectivism Cultural
Dimension, I WORLD PSYCHOL. 91 (1995).
127. See Tammy English & Serena Chen, Culture and Self-Concept Stability: Consistency
Across and Within Contexts Among Asian Americans and European Americans, 93 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 478 (2007) (showing that cross-cultural differences in self-concept are consistent and
stable).
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task of the interdependent self is not differentiation, but instead the
maintenance of relationships, restraint, fulfillment of role obligations, and
accounting for the thoughts, emotions, and behaviors of other people.
In the currently leading theory of cross-cultural dimensions by Schwartz,
this fundamental difference maps onto a dimension of autonomy versus
embeddedness.128 According to Schwartz's theory, embeddedness represents a
cultural emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and restraint of
actions or inclinations that might disrupt group solidarity or the traditional
order. The opposite pole of autonomy describes cultures in which the person is
viewed as an autonomous, bounded entity who finds meaning in his or her own
uniqueness.
This distinction between an autonomous self, distinguished from other
societal members by well-defined boundaries, and an embedded self, whose
very societal existence is characterized by fluid, diffuse, and contextual
relations with numerous others, is relevant to the legal realm.129 Specifically,
the notion of a person as a bounded social entity goes hand in hand with well-
defined property rights and legal entitlements more generally. A cultural
construal of the self as diffuse and contextual entails that legal entitlements,
including entitlements to assets, will also be diffuse and less well defined. If in
high-embeddedness cultures who and what one is may depend on context, then
what one owns and the features of such ownership may also depend on context.
The concept of property in such cultures may be fuzzy not because it is not
fully developed; on the contrary, ownership would be fuzzy because the mature
self who bears claims to property is fuzzy.
Thus far, there has been no empirical analysis of the relationship between
culture and property rights. This paper is the first to do so, drawing on evidence
about the closely related subject of the rule of law.' 30 In its basic, narrow
meaning, the rule of law implies that legal entitlements will be respected in
most circumstances, irrespective of the context, because the ultimate source of
guidance is what the law says. Respecting one's uniqueness and boundedness
means that one's entitlements are also well defined. When a rule-of-law society
provides people with a comprehensive set of rights and freedoms and
effectively enforces them, it also gives concrete expression to cultural
128. See Shalom H. Schwartz, A Theory of Cultural Value Differences and Some Implications
for Work, 48 APPLIED PSYCHOL. INT'L REV. 23 (1999). For a general overview of the subject, see SMITH
ET AL., supra note 122, at 12-19.
129. The link between law and social relations is in itself not a novel idea. In modem legal
writing, the conceptualization of property relations as a set of social relations dates back to the work of
the legal realists in the early twentieth century, as well as to later writers in the critical legal studies
school, such as Duncan Kennedy and Joseph Singer. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale
and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327 (1991); Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86
NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1991). For a critical analysis of this writing, see Stephen R. Munzer, Property as
Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 36 (Stephen R.
Munzer ed., 2001). Greg Alexander has recently constructed a broad-based progressive "social
obligation" theory of property. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009). We leave a fuller discussion of Alexander's theory for
another time.
130. The following passage draws on Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples
Obey the Law, 4 REv. L. & ECON. 715, 738-39 (2008).
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autonomy. In contrast, in high-embeddedness societies, respect for tradition,
honoring elders, and obedience are salient values. The ultimate source of
guidance about the right behavior may vary with context and cannot be rigid. In
a study of some fifty countries, cultural emphasis on autonomy and de-
emphasis on embeddedness emerges as a dominant factor that positively
correlates with perceived levels of the rule of law in nations.131 This factor,
moreover, was found to be causal; cultural orientations of autonomy versus
embeddedness affect the level of the rule of law. 132
To more closely address the relations between cultural emdeddedness
versus autonomy and property rights, we exploit recently available comparative
data on property rights protection to conduct a rigorous analysis of this issue.133
In particular, as measures of property rights we utilize composite indices for
physical property rights and intellectual property rights constructed by the
Property Rights Alliance, an advocacy group inspired and led by Hernando de
Soto.134 The Appendix describes the data, presents the regressions, and
discusses them more technically. Here we summarize the findings in a
nontechnical way. Figures 2 and 3 depict graphically the relations between
cultural embeddedness and the 2009 indices of physical and intellectual
property rights protection, respectively. The dots represent country
observations, and the sloping line represents the best linear relationship
between each pair of variables. A clear negative association emerges, indicating
that the more a country's culture emphasizes embeddedness values and de-
emphasizes autonomy values, the less likely it is to protect property rights (in
the way the latter are captured by the indices). The steeper slope for intellectual
property rights protection in Figure 3 indicates that this association is stronger
for this type of property.
131. Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture Rules: The
Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 659, 661 (2007). A
similar effect was found for noncorruption and the praxis of democracy. Id.
132. Causality was assessed using instrumental variable regression analysis. In particular, this
study shows that a grammar rule on pronoun drop license, which is linked to contextualization of
subjects in speech, captures sufficient variability in autonomy/embeddedness to significantly predict
governance. For further details and theoretical background, see Licht et al., supra note 131. See also
Guido Tabellini, Institutions and Culture, 6 J. EUR. ECoN. ASS'N 294 (2008) (adopting this empirical
strategy). Anecdotally, Donald C. Clarke points out how this grammatical feature in Chinese obscures
the identity of officials who may be responsible for sanctioning corporations. Donald C. Clarke, How Do
We Know when an Enterprise Exists? Unanswerable Questions and Legal Polycentricity in China, 19
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 50, 66, n.42 (2005).
133. The analysis is therefore limited to property rights protection. In addition, in the context of
the public aspect of property law, see the collection of 104 property clauses in constitutions worldwide
in VAN DER WALT, supra note 78.
134. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITAL TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) (arguing that formalizing property rights is essential for utilizing
capital).
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Figure 2. Relation Between Cultural Embeddedness and Physical Property
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While the association shown in the figures is clearly suggestive, the
scattered dots in the graph indicate that in addition to inevitable measurement
errors of these concepts, other factors may also be involved in the level of
property rights protection. Moreover, the relations that the slopes suggest are
merely correlational. They do not indicate the direction of causality-namely,
whether cultural embeddedness actually causes lower levels of protection. To
address both issues we use a regression analysis employing a previously
developed basic specification,'3 which includes one cultural orientation from
each of the three cultural dimensions distinguished by Schwartz 36 and two
control variables, one each for British heritage and economic inequality. The
British heritage variable captures, among other things, potential effects of
having a common law system in most of the countries with such heritage, a
factor that has been shown to have wide-ranging implications."' Why a British
heritage would be linked to higher levels of legality is a question that has been
relatively under-theorized, unfortunately.' 3 8  We control for economic
inequality to capture the effect of differences in economic power on respect or
disrespect for property rights.13 9
The regression results are striking. Embeddedness again emerges as a
negative explanatory variable for both physical property rights protection and
intellectual property rights protection, in line with our hypothesis.14 0 In this
setting, too, the results are more pronounced for intellectual property than for
physical property. This may be the case because intellectual property is a more
recent legal phenomenon. As a result, its informal social norms (e.g., copyright
piracy), which are linked to cultural orientations, 14 1 exhibit greater cross-
country variability.
Similarly to the previously documented relations between cultural
autonomy/embeddeness and the rule of law, the present regression results
indicate that a country's fundamental societal orientation toward autonomy or
embeddeness causally affects the degree to which its particular institutions
protect property.142 These findings also shed light on a related question-
135. See Licht et al., supra note 131, at 671.
136. The dimensions are autonomy versus embeddedness, hierarchy versus egalitarianism, and
harmony versus mastery. See Schwartz, supra note 128.
137. For a survey, see Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The
Economic Consequences ofLegal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008).
138. For a theory that focuses on different patterns of colonial settlement, see Daron Acemoglu,
Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An
Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001). For a recent analysis see Ronald J. Daniels,
Michelle J. Trebilock & Lindsey D. Carson, The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and
Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2010), available
at http://comparativelaw.metapress.com/content/I 2117.
139. The list of potentially relevant control variables for such a broad issue is especially lengthy
and includes factors like economic development, societal fractionalization, and religion. Some of these
factors raise additional problems because they may be mutually determined (endogenous) with the
factors analyzed here. For a discussion and empirical analysis see Licht et al., supra note 131.
140. We defer discussion of other results to another time.
141. See Licht, supra note 130.
142. This proposition stems from the results in the two-step-least-squares regressions, which
identify the influence of cultural embeddedness on property rights while isolating any (plausible)
feedback effect from the level of property rights protection on cultural orientations.
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namely, to what extent is the observed effect stable, or, put more generally yet,
how stable are cultural orientations? Culture scholars agree that cultural values
and orientations respond to and, to a degree, reflect contemporary socio-
economic conditions, including the level of economic development,
globalization, migration trends, and so forth. No culture is immune to the
impact of these factors. At the same time, there is growing recognition that
basic cultural stances may be highly stable.143 The present analysis shows that
whatever the (expected) effect of contemporary conditions on cultural
autonomy/embeddedness, this cultural dimension has a stable core that exerts a
strong influence on important policy outcomes such as the protection of
property rights.
These findings thus link property, personhood, and culture in a
psychological analytical framework. Property and ownership appear to be
universal psychological constructs, whose content meanings are recognized
similarly across cultures. 1" Control over material resources is among the
factors comprising the value of power, which has been shown to be a universal
motivational goal.145 Insights from this research are now starting to inform
legal discourse.146 For example, the classic question as to whether first
possession entitles one to ownership-decided in the affirmative in Pierson v.
Postl47-is receiving empirical support.148 Friedman and Neary aver that
"children learn about ownership not only from adults, whose intuitions are in
turn roughly consistent with the law, but also from their general experiences
living in a culture in which ownership is closely linked with first
possession."l49 This echoes an old idea in anthropology, namely, that the social
implications of property and ownership differ across cultures 50 (though they
143. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 595, 597 (2000) (arguing that informal institutions are "pervasively linked with
complementary institutions" such that the resulting institutions "have a lasting grip on the way a society
conducts itself').
144. See Ori Friedman & Karen R. Neary, First Possession Beyond the Law: Adults'and Young
Children's Intuitions about Ownership, 83 TUL. L. REv. 679, 679-80 n.1 (2009) (citing DONALD E.
BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS (1991)).
145. See Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical
Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries, in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 9, 28 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992); Shalom H. Schwartz, Value Orientations:
Measurement, Antecedents and Consequences Across Nations, in MEASURING ATTITUDES CROSS-
NATIONALLY: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY 169 (Roger Jowell et al. eds., 2009).
146. Margaret Radin has already related property and personhood in the legal literature as a
conceptual matter. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
However, the link between property and psychology has not been addressed until recently. See Jeremy
A. Blumenthal, "To Be Human": A Psychological Perspective on Property Law, 83 TUL. L. REV. 609
(2009); Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2009). For a recent
law and psychology collaboration in the context of the "moral right" in copyright law, see Frederick
Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Artists' Moral Rights and the Psychology of Ownership, 83 TUL. L.
REV. 661 (2009).
147. 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
148. See Ori Friedman, First Possession: An Assumption Guiding Inferences About Who Owns
What, 15 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 290 (2008); Ori Friedman & Karen R. Neary, Determining Who
Owns What: Do Children Infer Ownership from First Possession?, 107 COGNITION 829 (2008).
149. Friedman & Neary, supra note 144, at 686.
150. For a review, see Floyd W. Rudmin, Cross-Cultural Correlates of the Ownership of
Private Property: A Summary of Five Studies, ANTHROGLOBE J. (2006), http://www.anthroglobe.info/
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may be a universal psychological construct at the individual level).
To put some contextual flesh on the regression findings, we invite readers
to consider the stark differences between North American and North-East
Asian cultures. The former (mostly in the United States) has been characterized
as high on individualism or autonomy, the latter (mostly in China) as high on
collectivism or embeddedness.15 These differences have historical roots that
may go back to Aristotle and Confucius and have been linked to a variety of
psychological factors, leading to the treatment of cultures as "systems of
thought." 5 2 Markus and Kitayama thus point out that American culture
emphasizes individual inalienable rights-for example, "life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness"-while the Chinese culture emphasizes group harmony,
as reflected in the Confucian tradition. 1
Consistent differences in conceptions of property may be observed in
additional contexts. For instance, in 2007, China enacted its Property Rights
Law of the People's Republic of China after years of stormy debates.' 5 4 Codes
of civil law countries, most prominently Germany and Japan, explicitly
influenced the drafting of the statute.155 But this did not mean that China turned
its back on its ideological and cultural heritage, nor that the adoption of
Western formats and concepts dictated a particular substantive outcome. Thus,
alongside the protection of individual property rights in Article 4, under which
such rights "shall not be infringed by any institute or individuals," the statute
simultaneously includes the same protection for state and collective property
rights.
The concept of collective property rights, which may sound like an
oxymoron to legal purists in Western legal systems,1 56 reflects deeply rooted
docs/rudminfownership 000000.htm (meta-analyzing findings of earlier anthropological studies on
cultures around the world and concluding that "private ownership [is found] to be a positive correlate
with agricultural subsistence, social stratification, social control based on law and religion, large
populations and permanent settlements, patriarchal family norms, support of the aged, especially aged
men, and economic practices of trade, money, debt, metallurgy, and war").
151. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 122.
152. Richard E. Nisbett et al., Cultures and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic
Cognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REv. 291 (2001); see also Alan Page Fiske et al., The Cultural Matrix of
Social Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 915 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske &
Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998); Kaiping Peng, Daniel R. Ames & Eric Knowles, Culture and
Human Inference: Perspectives from Three Traditions, in HANDBOOK OF CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY
245 (David Matsumoto ed., 2001). The focus in these theories is on cultural approaches to ambiguity,
contradiction, and related concepts. Although Alexander mentions the "Aristotelian notion that the
human being is a social and political animal," it appears that he refers to a different aspect in Aristotle.
Alexander, supra note 129, at 760. This issue lies outside the scope of this Article.
153. Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, A Collective Fear of the Collective:
Implications for Selves and Theories ofSelves, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 568 (1994).
154. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wuquanfa ( *AR~fl1"V) [Property Rights Law
of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective
Oct. 1, 2007), 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. 291. An unofficial English version
is available at http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/general/property-rights-
law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.html. See also Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The Newly
Enacted Chinese Property Law and the Protection of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
317,321 (2008).
155. Lehavi, supra note 106, at 437.
156. This is not to say that Western thought has not considered the potential advantages of
collective ownership over private ownership in specific scenarios. Probably most prominent in this
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views about the relations between persons and assets in China. Traditionally,
households and clans held property collectively and intertemporally.' 57 This
concept, however, may also allude to China's more recent township and village
enterprises (TVEs). In these entities, remnants from China's turbulent twentieth
century, there are no property rights to speak of. Assets have been held
collectively for the benefit of town and village residents and run by managers
with no clear accountability. Naughton thus notes that "[t]he complexity of
these arrangements has led some to describe TVE property rights as 'fuzzy.' In
fact, the property rights were able to accommodate numerous stakeholders
flexibly, adapt to an enormous range of situations, and often produce effective
and entrepreneurial organizations." It may be the case that in the particular
institutional environment of government structure, TVEs provided security
against expropriation by local governments.159 In any event, the complete
fuzziness of property rights within the TVEs has not prevented them from
becoming China's major engine of growth, thus seemingly defying the link
between well-defined, well-protected property rights and economic
development, and, more generally, between the rule of law and development.1 60
Moreover, this fuzziness of legal entitlements is not limited to standard
property. Even corporations, which arguably are purely legal constructs, for a
long time have not been fully recognized as entities in China, while families,
which do not have a legal status as such, have been. 161 As Donald Clarke has
masterfully demonstrated, it is not even possible to know if a Chinese
corporation exists, as Chinese courts and government agencies do not consider
a statute to be necessary for the recognition of an organization's existence.162
To recap, while a full discussion of general propositions on culture, the
rule of law, and development greatly exceeds the scope of this Article, 63it
respect is the work of Elinor Ostrom, the 2009 Nobel Prize laureate in economics, on common property
regimes (CPRs). See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). It should be emphasized, however, that Ostrom's analysis is based
largely on utilitarian considerations, and that one of the building blocks of a successful CPR is that
"individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly
defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself." Id. at 90-91. Therefore, fuzziness and fluidness are
not part of the package. The CPR is "exclusive property with respect to outsiders." Carol M. Rose, The
Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Talks, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83
MINN. L. REV. 129, 181 (1998). For a depiction of the American property system as generally based on
rights formalism and free market propensity, see Amnon Lehavi, The Taking/Taxing Taxonomy, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 1235, 1242-55 (2010).
157. See Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1616-24 (2000).
158. BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH 122 (2007);
see also Martin L. Weitzman & Chenggang Xu, Chinese Township- Village Enterprises as Vaguely
Defined Cooperatives, 18 J. COMP. ECON. 121 (1994).
159. Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem,
51 AM. J. COMp. L. 89, 107 (2003).
160. See Brett H. McDonnell, Lessons from the Rise and (Possible) Fall of Chinese Township-
Village Enterprises, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 953 (2004); Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng:
Speculations on the Implications of Chinese Growth for Law and Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 551 (2009).
161. See Ruskola,supra note 157, at 1623-45.
162. Clarke, supra note 132.
163. For a good treatment, see, for example, John K.M. Ohnesorge, The Rule ofLaw, Economic
Development, and the Developmental States of Northeast Asia, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST
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stands to reason that the world of BITs should be influenced by such deeply
rooted societal orientations. Societies' cultural orientations constitute their
fundamental institutions.' 64 They affect shared, implicitly held beliefs on what
is right, legitimate, and desirable. Cultural orientations are therefore likely to
shape views about ownership in property and what might constitute an
infringement of property rights. They are also likely to shape views about what
compensation in case of expropriation would be fair and equitable-a heavily
value-laden concept-both in the eyes of countries party to BITs as well as in
the eyes of arbitration tribunals.1 6 5 Crucially, culture affects both personally
held values and beliefs and more specific social institutions. There is no clear
way to avoid its impact.' 66 The fragmented structure of the BITs network and
of arbitration-based dispute resolution will only exacerbate these differences.1 67
Finally, because cultures are widely seen as very stable institutions, the
relations we uncover in this Article suggest that BITs and other efforts to unify
property regimes may face substantial hurdles.
B. Actor Heterogeneity
Another prominent and related feature that is instrumental to the
feasibility of BIT-based property protection concerns the level of homogeneity
among the actors on different sides of the border. Here, we do not refer to the
overall cultural attributes of the respective societies, but more pointedly to the
identity of the specific parties that are typically affected by the property norms
regarding a certain kind of resource.
Concisely, our main argument here is that to the extent that the affected
parties share an epistemological, social, and cultural common ground, there is a
greater likelihood that supranational norms will have in rem validity, even if
the respective domestic property systems are otherwise different from one
another. This could be achieved in view of the fact that such actors are better
able to identify, absorb, and act based on the potential implications of the
additional layers of norms introduced by BITs. The same holds, moreover,
when the parties are part of a bottom-up process of creating norms, practices,
and other socio-legal mechanisms that could affect the way in which BIT cross-
border norms are applied. In contrast, when those affected by the property
norms are made up of more heterogeneous groups, the ability of the BIT
mechanism to set up a property regime that promotes certainty declines
dramatically.
AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 70 (Christoph Antons ed., 2003).
164. Licht, supra note 130, at 728.
165. Commentators have emphasized that the "fair and equitable" standard does not simply
refer to the civil law concept of a remedy ex aequo et bono. See supra note 20 and sources therein; see
also Leon Trakman, Ex Aequo et Bono: Demystifying an Ancient Concept, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 621 (2008).
166. See Williamson, supra note 143.
167. For preliminary attempts to assess the performance of BIT arbitrations, reaching
inconclusive results, see Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes ofInvestment Treaty Arbitration,
50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 435 (2009); and Kathleen S. McArthur & Pablo A. Ormachea, International
Investor-State Arbitration: An Empirical Analysis of ICSID Decisions on Jurisdiction, 28 REV. LITIG.
559 (2009).
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To understand the role of the actors' level of homogeneity, consider the
lex mercatoria. This body of norms developed in Medieval Europe as a
grassroots form of private ordering that connected merchants from different
territories and was aimed at enabling traders to follow common norms and
resolve disputes speedily.!68 Although there is some uncertainty about the
historical origins and actual content of the lex mercatoria,169 it is safe to say
that during that period, a set of customary norms applying to the class of
merchants evolved on a nondomestic basis and was practiced in various
meeting places, typically in trade fairs across the continent. These fairs also
became places for dispute resolution, with merchants themselves setting up and
administering the tribunals.170
The importance of the law merchant norms exceeded the contractual
aspects of the transactions. In fact, the law merchant created the prominent
legal and financial instruments of personal property that are known today.
Although instruments such as letters of credit existed in earlier periods, the law
merchant era introduced the practice of a documentary transfer of an
intangible-the right to a debt-and, even more importantly, the evolution of
the practice by which a trader who purchased the negotiable instrument (e.g., a
bill of exchange) in good faith did so free of any prior interests of third parties
in it, including those of the original parties to the sale transaction. The
negotiable instrument thus acquired an independent status as an object of
property, entitling its holder to a certain amount of money, such right being
separated from the contractual rights and duties embedded in the original sale
-171transaction.
Moreover, besides some clear property norms that had been accepted
throughout the trade community, the merchants also were aware of what we
now call "incomplete" contractual and proprietary aspects of commercial
relationships.172 Thus, the core of trade practices was the "good faith"
principle.173 The relative homogeneity of traders' commercial interests and
social understandings across the continent allowed them to handle effectively
such contingencies and ambiguities by consent or through the streamlined
process of expert tribunals. Such cross-border conformity and efficiency
gradually declined as national courts and legislatures took over commercial
law.174
Nowadays, with the growing globalization of economies, questions of
cross-border organizational structures and choice strategies for substantive and
procedural property norms reemerge in full force, both in BITs and in other
contexts. The fact that merchants across borders still share substantial common
168. See, e.g., LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EvOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL
LAW 7-21 (1983).
169. See Richard A. Epstein, Reflections on the Historical Origins and Economic Structure of
the Law Merchant, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-4 (2004).
170. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 46 (2000).
171. Id. at47-49.
172. Lehavi, supra note 87, at 27-30.
173. TRAKMAN, supra note 168, at 7.
174. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 170, at 46-47.
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ground has led to numerous calls to recognize and validate a "New Lex
Mercatoria," which would have both contractual and proprietary supranational
effects."' Dalhuisen suggests, for example, the creation of a new integrated
system among professionals, in which the contemporary needs of cross-border
finance and investment would be effectively met. Arguing that practices,
custom, and general legal principles have taken root among professionals
across much of the globe, Dalhuisen suggests that such a new structure could
work even if it is not made up of a single coherent and closed legal system, but
is rather committed to "legal dynamism, internationalization, and
experimentation."'
76
To better address the reality of markets and financial instruments, the new
law merchant should, inter alia, liberally accept the proprietary status of user,
enjoyment, and income rights in movable assets, and also allow for trusts,
floating charges, and finance sales to more freely operate in the in rem realm.' 77
Moreover, new mechanisms for proprietary status, protection, and transfer
should be designed specifically for each type of resource or product, based on
the relevant trade norms and practices that apply to it. Being aware, however,
of the fact that such innovative industry-driven property or property-like
structures would also affect other kinds of third parties, and that certain realms
of the law would remain domestic even in a new merchant law era, Dalhuisen
calls, for example, for a reformulation of domestic bankruptcy laws, which
would recognize these new proprietary forms and interests.178
Without examining in detail the feasibility of a new lex mercatoria, it
seems clear that there are better prospects for supranational property norms
where the relevant recipients of the norms are relatively homogenous. Such
actors would have a genuine interest in reaching common ground not only for
the contractual aspects of professional dealings, but also for shaping the
broader property contours by trying to bridge potential discrepancies between
BIT provisions and domestic property doctrines.
Conversely, for heterogeneous parties, this task may prove overly
ambitious. Consider the following case, implicating the 1993 BIT between
Germany and Paraguay.' 79 In the late 1990s, the government of Paraguay
refused to apply its own land laws to transfer title of lands in the village of
Palmital to 120 landless peasant families, who had been occupying for years an
175. For the renewed interest in the lex mercatoria, see, for example, Symposium, The
Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings of the Law Merchant, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
176. JAN H. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL,
FINANCIAL AND TRADE LAw 30-33 (3d ed. 2007).
177. These rights, however, should be subject to protections for bona fide purchasers and
sometimes also to protections for purchasers in the ordinary course of business for commoditized assets.
Id. at vi, 20-25.
178. Id at vii, 582-86.
179. Gesetz zu dem Vertrag vom I1. August 1993 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
und der Republik Paraguay iber die Foirderung und den gegenseitigen Schutz von Kapitalanlagen [Law
on the Treaty of August I1, 1993 Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of
Paraguay on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Dec. 5, 1997, BGBL. II at 2080
(Ger.) [hereinafter Germany-Paraguay BIT].
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estate of over 1,000 hectares (nearly 2,500 acres) that had been idle.'so The
refusal to apply these agrarian reform laws and either to force the landowners
to sell the lands or to expropriate them was grounded in the fact that the land
was owned by several German citizens and that the BIT among the two
countries arguably prohibited the expropriation of rural property owned by
Germans.' 8 ' The peasant families were forcibly evicted from the land, and their
leaders were imprisoned.182 Later, the peasants, the owners, and the
government of Paraguay reached an out-of-court settlement that allowed the
peasants to remain on the land.183 But at the same time, it seems that both on
the formal (prior to settlement) and informal levels, the provisions of the BIT
did not represent common ground among the different actors affected by the
property norms applying to the asset. Local land rules were simply pushed to
the side to make room for a property lex specialis for the owners, without
considering the overall implications for the country's land regime. The
implementation of country-wide agrarian land reform in lands owned by
German citizens was effectively blocked due to the BIT.' 84
Had the political economy considerations in such a scenario been
different, so that local land law and policy prevailed (based, for example, on
sincerely held values of justice and access to land that prevail in Paraguay
among both residents and decisionmakers), the investor probably would have
ended up suing for the BIT violation. In short, given the enormous cultural,
economic, and legal heterogeneity among the relevant actors involved in this
dispute, and the fact that such disparity was not initially bridged by
systematically revising the property system in land to accommodate both local
and supranational norms, the aspiration of the BIT to promote security and
stability of property rights was doomed to fail.
C. Asset Heterogeneity
Another source of potential heterogeneity, which also touches to some
extent on the issue of property actors, concerns the types of assets that are the
object of property rights. Different types of assets diverge substantially in the
ways that the corresponding property rights are constructed, allocated, and
enforced. This in turn influences the ability of BITs to create property rights
and duties that are distinct from domestic laws.
Consider, first, the case of land. Different rights and interests in land are
inherently bound up in an exceptionally tight manner. As the above example of
the land in the Paraguayan village of Palmital indicates, the same tract of land
may implicate numerous right holders with competing claims to the asset.
180. For reports on this case, see UTE HAUSMANN & ROLF KONNEMANN, GERMANY'S
EXTRATERRITORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 15 (Ute Hausmann et al. eds., 2006), available at
http://www.eed.de/fix/files/doc/eedGermanys extraterritorial human-rights_06 eng.pdf; and A
German Privilege, GERMAN-FOREIGN-POLICY.COM (Nov. 21, 2007), http://www.german-foreign-policy
.com/en/fulltext/56112.
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These conflicts may touch not only on possession and use of the land (e.g., in
the case of a landowner vis-i-vis a tenant), but also on other types of interests,
such as easements and mortgages, as well as the interests of different circles of
claimants and outside stakeholders, such as neighbors who may have a
recognizable claim to prevent certain kinds of use and enjoyment of the land
defined as nuisances under domestic law.' 8 5
This means that even if we assume, arguendo, that it is normatively
attractive to allow legal discrimination in favor of foreign investors in some
legal realms, enforcing this policy through the BIT mechanism may often prove
difficult.
Matters may be somewhat different for other types of assets. On the face
of it, the technical feasibility of providing in a treaty that a patent owned by a
foreign citizen cannot be taken through a compulsory license in the host
country would seem to involve fewer direct stakeholders, although it might still
indirectly impact would-be consumers of an end product that might have been
developed using the protected technology.' 86 Ownership in corporations poses a
challenge of an altogether different scope. Whatever one's favorite metaphor
for a corporation-a "nexus of contracts," a "mediating hierarchy," etc.187_
there is no denying that the interests of several stakeholder groups are closely
intertwined in it. The raison d'Otre of the corporation is to pool together
resources from various constituencies under a unified and separate legal
umbrella.188 The interaction between these heterogeneous interests is highly
complex, making it difficult to isolate and assess only one of them.' 9 This
interaction, moreover, varies across national systems of corporate
governance,190 notwithstanding a general similarity of corporations as investor-
oriented entities.'91
In any case, it is clear that property poses a challenge for legal
differentiation, one that is different from other types of legal rights. Compare
this to the feasibility of creating legal differentiation in income taxation, such
that, hypothetically, a foreign resident working in the host country would pay
only twenty percent in tax for the same level of gross revenue for which a local
185. Lehavi, supra note 81, at 2004-05.
186. The United States is demanding from its trade partners more extensive protection for
intellectual property rights than is conferred by the multilateral standards in the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Such standards, which can be created by
signing bilateral intellectual property agreements (BIPs), are known as TRIPS-plus. See Peter Drahos,
BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791, 794-97 (2001).
187. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 254 (1999); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a
Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 819 (1999).
188. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
I10 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000).
189. For one example, see Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the
Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1364-65 (2007).
190. See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003); Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and
Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1999).
191. See John Armour et al., What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW:
A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 1-34 (2d ed. 2009).
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resident pays thirty percent tax. This may be of course annoying to locals, but it
is quite feasible as a matter of legal engineering. Property rights in assets
present a different case. This is especially so when the different interests are
embedded in the same physical resource, such as land, such that preferring the
rights of the foreign investor to the asset based on the BIT would necessarily
come at the expense of another (local) party, who loses her control and
management over the very same asset.
But obviously, the issue of asset heterogeneity does not boil down simply
to the issue of the technical feasibility of legal differentiation. In just about
every legal system, the core justifications for protecting property rights may
differ for different assets. The "bundle of rights" for land, chattels, intellectual
property, shares, negotiable instruments, and so forth may be different, since
society's decisionmaking institutions may very well reach different conclusions
when designing the basic structure of property for different resources, including
different normative trade-offs between individual rights and the public
interest.192 Various considerations of utility, ethics, egalitarianism, etc., may
point to different normative choices of legal rules in land vis-A-vis intellectual
property, for example. Accordingly, the legal boundaries of the "fair use"
doctrine in copyrighted materials in the United States do not apply to the laws
governing encroachments on private land.193 Moreover, even when a country's
constitutional bill of rights refers generally to "property," it seems clear at the
outset that not all types of assets would be legally treated in the same way in
property jurisprudence.194 Accordingly, the attributes of culture, as analyzed in
Section IV.B, supra, play a crucial role not only in explaining the differences
among countries, but also those within a single legal system. For example, to
the extent that a system recognizes that indigenous tribes' cultures carry
essential normative force that translates into increased constitutional protection
for rights that reflect these cultural tenets, it is clear that this aspect of culture
would have a strong impact on rights to land, but practically none, for example,
on corporate shareholding. 95
BITs, however, are surprisingly agnostic on this issue. Take, for example,
192. Lehavi, supra note 81, at 2002.
193. For a discussion of such tension, see Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the
Right To Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 675 (1993). For similarities and differences in the protection of
property in land vis-A-vis intellectual property, compare Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property and the
Property Rights Movement, REGULATION, Fall 2007, at 36, with Richard A. Epstein, A Response to
Peter Menell: The Property Rights Movement and Intellectual Property, REGULATION, Winter 2008, at
58.
194. Thus, for example, the constitution of post-Apartheid South Africa includes a special
commitment to the just redistribution of land to correct past wrongs and to effect a genuine social
transformation. For a comprehensive analysis, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE
OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY 135-82 (2006). In comparison, South Africa seems to maintain a
more "conventional" approach to property protection for rights in other types of assets. See, e.g., First
Nat ' Bank of S. Afr. Ltd. v. Comm r, S. Afr. Revenue Serv. 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) (S. Afr.) (invalidating
a statute that provided that a state tax lien would supersede the right of a lender to reserve ownership in
chattels (in this case, motor vehicles) as security for its loan to the buyer).
195. For a famous case that defines certain aboriginal rights to land in Canada as relying
directly on validating "practices, customs, and traditions which are integral to the distinctive aboriginal
cultures of the group claiming the right," see Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010,
para. 138 (Can.).
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the provisions of the 2005 BIT between Germany and China,196 two countries
that are both powerful but nevertheless hold entirely different viewpoints on
many issues, including in their property philosophy for landownership or
intellectual property.' 97 The nonexclusive definition of the term "investment" in
Article 1 of the BIT includes: "(a) movable and immovable property and other
property rights such as mortgages and pledges; (b) shares, debentures, stock
and any other kind of interest in companies; (c) claims to money . . . ; (d)
intellectual property rights . . . ; (and] (e) business concessions . *... The
BIT provisions regarding the protection of investment apply across the board
and do not make a single reference to the potential differentiation among
different types of assets in delineating the scope of protection for investments.
Time will tell whether BIT disputes will be resolved differently based on
the type of resource at stake. If (although it seems unlikely) German investors
were protected in similar terms based on the "fair and equitable treatment"
clause or the "expropriation" article regardless of the type of investment they
make in China, the effect of such arbitral jurisprudence on the diversity of
property domestic regimes in China would go well beyond the specific disputes
and might undermine the essentially different perspectives that Chinese
decisionmakers hold on land, shares, chattels, or copyright. If, conversely,
arbitral awards generally were to defer to the different policy considerations
that govern the design of domestic property doctrines for different types of
resources in Chinese law, the core goals of investor certainty and host
government commitments might well be undermined for German investors,
with potential implications for any of the approximately 130 BITs to which
Germany is a signatory. 199
In view of the rapid proliferation of BIT disputes and the gradual switch
toward a "property discourse" in resolving them, these questions regarding the
heterogeneity of resources-which relate to one of the key design principles of
BIT-making for countries such as the United States or Germany, i.e., a "one-
size-fits-all" model BIT-may come under growing pressure and cast doubts
on the ability of BITs to provide a stable legal regime for investors.
D. Legal Norm Heterogeneity: Vertical
Property is the subject of multiple layers of norms, of which BITs
196. Gesetz zu dem Abkommen vom 1. Dezember 2003 zwischen der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und der Volksrepublik China uiber die Forderung und den gegenseitigen Schutz von
Kapitalanlagen [Law on the Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's
Republic of China on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Aug. 3, 2005,
BGBL. 1I at 732 (Ger.) [hereinafter Germany-China BIT].
197. For an analysis of China's distinctive normative approach to property rights in land, see
supra text accompanying notes 154-162.
198. Germany-China BIT, supra note 196, art. 1.
199. For a formal list of the BITs to which Germany is a signatory, see BUNDESMINISTERIUM
FOR WIRTSCHAFT AND TECHNOLOGIE, UBERSICHT OBER DIE BILATERALEN INVESTITIONSFORDERUNGS
UND SCHUTZVERTRAGE (IFV) DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [REVIEW OF BILATERAL
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION AGREEMENTS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] (Aug. 28, 2010)
(Ger.), available at http://www.bmwi.de/BMWilRedaktion/PDF/B/bilaterale-investitionsfoerderungs-
und-schutzvertraege-IFV,property-pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=de,rwbtrue.pdf.
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constitute only one layer. Thus, the boundaries of property rights, especially in
land, may be blurred regardless of efforts by parties to BITs to delineate them
with clarity. A BIT, or an adjudication applying it, that disconnects itself from
other layers of property norms by looking to the provisions of the BIT alone
may prove inefficient.
To illustrate the problem of vertical heterogeneity regarding the legal
design of property norms, consider another dispute implicating the Germany-
200
Paraguay BIT. In 2001, the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community of the
Enxet People submitted a petition to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, alleging that the government of Paraguay violated the American
Convention on Human Rights, including the right to property.201' The tribe
argued that the government failed to recover part of the tribe's ancestral lands
totaling over 14,000 hectares (about 34,600 acres) in line with the American
Convention and with Paraguayan domestic legislation, both of which recognize
the right of indigenous peoples to preserve their way of life in their traditional
202lands. As a result, community members were living in inhumane conditions,
resulting in a number of deaths due to lack of food and medical care.203 The
government contended that the lands were formally owned by German citizens,
and that the executive branch's efforts to expropriate the land were effectively
blocked by the legislature because of the provisions of the Germany-Paraguay
BIT.204
In March 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled in favor
205of the tribe. The Court reasoned that the enforcement of BITs does not allow
a state to avoid its obligations under the American Convention on Human
Rights, but rather that "their enforcement should always be compatible with the
American Convention." 206 The Court further reasoned that although it is "not a
domestic judicial authority with jurisdiction to decide disputes among private
parties," it is nevertheless competent to "analyze whether the State ensured the
human rights of the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community." 207
In the Court's view, the government of Paraguay's recognition of the
tribe's communal property rights to traditional lands remains "meaningless in
practice if the lands have not been physically . . . surrendered because the
adequate domestic measures necessary to secure effective use and enjoyment of
said right . . . are lacking." 208 The Court thus ordered the state to "adopt all
legislative, administrative and other measures necessary to formally and
physically convey to the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community their
200. Germany-Paraguay BIT, supra note 179.
201. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 71, art. 21.
202. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 146, IT 116-124 (Mar. 29, 2006).
203. Id. 11 73(61)-(74).
204. Id. 1137.
205. Id. 1248.
206. According to the Court, the American Convention "is a multilateral treaty on human rights
that stands in a class of its own and that generates rights for individual human beings and does not
depend entirely on reciprocity among States." Id. 140.
207. Id. 1 136.
208. Id. 1 143.
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traditional lands, within three years." 209
The Sawhoyamaxa case vividly demonstrates the complicated,
multilayered structure of property law (in land, in this case), involving
international, national, and sub-national norms and institutions. This array
includes (1) an international human rights convention and its corresponding
international tribunal; (2) a cross-border bilateral treaty with its distinctive
arbitral forum; (3) general provisions in the Paraguayan Constitution and
national legislation about the recognition of traditional tribal rights and
commitment to land restitution; (4) the conventional land law of Paraguay with
its titling system and property rights that emanate from it; and (5) tribal norms,
institutions and practices of sub-society groups. All of these property layers are
tied up in the same physical asset in a highly complicated and multidirectional
manner.210
At the same time, this case illustrates the pitfall of isolating one layer of
norms, which is within the mandate of the adjudicative tribunal or is otherwise
considered as particularly prominent, while effectively ignoring the vertical
complexity of property. We argue that there is an inherent tension in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights's statement in Sawhoyamaxa that it is "not a
domestic judicial authority with jurisdiction to decide disputes among private
parties," 211 but that it is nevertheless competent to analyze whether Paraguay
ensured the human rights of the tribe, and that the court is thus capable of
212ordering the transfer of all lands within three years.
In this case, the BIT claim was on the losing side, but the jurisprudential
difficulty would be the same if the BIT were to trump other property layers.
More generally, the Court's intervention in this matter dramatically upset the
Paraguayan land regime by effectively holding that traditional tribe interests
supersede formal registered rights under Paraguayan land law. Yet the Court
explicitly ignores, in the name of lack of jurisdiction, the major jurisprudential
considerations that are inherently involved in such a fundamental change. 213it
effectively disregards the numerous layers of interests and categories of
stakeholders that are physically inseparable from one another due to the unique
traits of land, and that must be comprehensively dealt with so as to effectively
rearrange the overall property bundle in land.
In this case, beyond the general jurisprudential problem that we point to,
the BIT simply failed to provide the German landowners with the security that
they and others might have envisioned following the signing of the BIT
between the countries. Thus, the nature of property rights is such that their
boundaries may often be blurred notwithstanding efforts on behalf of parties to
BITs to delineate them with clarity. In this sense, BITs may simply prove
overly ambitious as a matter of legal design.
209. Id. 1248(6).
210. Lehavi, supra note 106, at 452-55.
211. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty., Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
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E. Legal Norm Heterogeneity: Horizontal
Yet another type of potential heterogeneity that may result from the
structure of supranational instruments such as BITs is one that we label
"horizontal" heterogeneity of legal norms. While BITs were originally intended
to increase certainty and stability, extra-national rules and decisions do not
necessarily mean more uniformity in the law. In fact, BITs may exacerbate
unwarranted differentiation. Since a single country is typically a signatory to
dozens of different BITs, and each of these BITs may include different
procedural and substantive provisions about the protection of investments and
property rights in relation thereto, the result may be "normative over-
fragmentation" of the property regime within the host country. 214
The problem of normative over-fragmentation can be acute, as, for
example, in the case of land. This is because the already complicated web of
intertwined rights and interests pertaining to the same asset is further
fragmented when people seek to enjoy their lex specialis as foreign residents
pursuant to BITs. And with the ever-growing phenomenon of foreign
investment in real estate for the purposes of investment and speculation, with
215investments flowing in various, often counterintuitive directions, no one can
anticipate how many different BIT-specific land law provisions will plausibly
be said to apply to the same tract of land in a specific place at a given time.
Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a piece of land is located in
Country A. The land is owned by a citizen of Country B; the tenant leasing the
land for commercial purposes is a citizen of Country C; the landowner's
mortgagor is a financial institution registered in Country D; the tenant's
secured creditor for purchased machinery items that are fixed to the ground is a
resident of Country E; an easement holder on the land (e.g., the holder of right
of passage on it) is a resident of Country F. A conflict arises when a resident of
Country G claims that he is the true owner of the land but his rights have been
taken away from him by a series of fraudulent deeds until the land ended up in
the hands of the current landowner. Such conflicting property claims are a
highly complicated matter in a regular domestic dispute. But when each one of
the stakeholders in such a scenario argues that his rights deserve distinctive,
stronger protection based on the provisions of the BIT between his country and
Country A, the host country, the problem of horizontal over-fragmentation may
become prohibitive.
A recent case decided by the ECJ illustrates the problem of fragmentation
in the BIT context. Although it is essentially a "vertical" conflict, since it deals
with the relationships between EU treaty provisions and a series of BITs signed
between individual EU members and third countries, it attests to the fact that
the BIT system is highly fragmented and thus legally fragile "horizontally" as
well.
In March 2009, the ECJ ruled in favor of the Commission of the
214. Lehavi, supra note 106, at 460-63.
215. See Weisman, supra note 61; see also supra text accompanying note 61.
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European Communities (the Commission) in an action against Sweden,216 with
a practically identical case being decided on the same date against Austria.217
Concisely, Sweden is a signatory to seventeen different BITs with non-EU
members. Each of these BITs contains a clause under which each party
guarantees to the investors of the other party "without undue delay, the free
transfer, in freely convertible currency, of payments connected with an
investment."218 The Commission took the view that these BITs were capable of
impeding the applications of restrictions on movements of capital and on
payments that the Council of the European Union might adopt as safeguard
measures, and required Sweden to take steps to eliminate the incompatibilities
concerning the provisions on such transfers contained in the various BITs.
Interestingly, the Council has not yet adopted such safeguard measures, which
it is authorized to take under Articles 57(2), 59, and 60(1) of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community. 2 19
Sweden argued that since no such safeguard measures have been taken
yet, requiring it to repudiate the BIT provisions vis-A-vis the third countries
would not only be unnecessary, but would also create enormous legal
uncertainty in other areas of members' activity, especially since EU member
states altogether have entered into more than a thousand BITs with non-EU
countries, with each BIT containing comparable clauses on transfers. 220 The
ECJ, however, ruled in favor of the Commission, reasoning that the time
involved in renegotiating a BIT and the unavailability of other international law
mechanisms, such as suspension of the BITs, require Sweden to take immediate
steps to eliminate the incompatibility so as to facilitate such potential EU
safeguard measures.22 1
Again, although this case originated in the "vertical" supremacy of the
European Union over member states' individual BITs, it raises broader
concerns as to what one might view as the "illusion of certainty" in BITs. The
horizontal fragmentation of BITs is particularly troubling when commitments
are deemed to create property or quasi-property rights that come on top of
domestic property rights for foreign investors.
Since current research demonstrates that incoherence between BIT
provisions to which a country is party with different countries is the rule rather
222than the exception, the proliferation of BITs may both undermine the ability
of host countries to sustain a coherent property system and increase uncertainty
among investors. This problem is especially acute when the conflict arises in
216. Case C-249/06, Comm'n of the Eur. Cmties. v. Sweden (Mar. 3, 2009), http://curia.
europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (enter "C-249/06" in "Case no" field, then follow link to "Judgment").
217. Case C-205/06, Comm'n of the Eur. Cmties. v. Austria (Mar. 3, 2009), http://curia.
europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (enter "C-205/06" in "Case no" field, then follow link to "Judgment").
Germany, Lithuania, Hungary, and Finland joined Austria and Sweden as "interveners" (interested third
parties) because the outcome would likely affect them as well. Id.
218. Case C-249/06, Sweden, 13.
219. Treaty Establishing the European Community arts. 57(2), 69, 60(1), Dec. 24, 2002, 2002
O.J. (C 325) 33.
220. Case C-249/06, Sweden, 18-22.
221. Id. 39-46.
222. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 17, at 56-61.
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private law disputes involving multiple property claims-including BIT-based
claims-to the same asset. To the extent that the BITs system continues to
operate in the current fractured manner, the phenomenon of "horizontal
heterogeneity" will increasingly present the parties with these major
institutional and jurisprudential challenges.
Should the BIT system continue to operate in its current fractured
manner? One might believe that notwithstanding its swollen dimensions, the
BIT system may be taking only its first steps and will eventually converge
toward one widely agreed-upon version. The model BIT trend mentioned
above 2 23 may lend support to such a belief. The evidence that property and
property rights are intimately linked to national cultural emphases on autonomy
versus embeddedness suggests otherwise, however.22 4 Even if the formal legal
texts reach uniformity, policymakers, courts, and other societal institutions in
different countries may apply these texts in a way that is consistent with their
cultural beliefs. Moreover, beyond the basic text of the BITs, countries' formal
225
laws, too, are linked to cultural orientations, such that full convergence is
simply impossible.
Finally, the analysis in the preceding two sections must not be mistaken
for a claim against legal pluralism. Legal pluralism, especially in international
law contexts, refers to the reality in which a particular phenomenon may be
subject to normative prescriptions coming from several sources, some of which
226may be formal and some informal (e.g., social norms or customary law). One
can readily observe that legal pluralism may introduce complexity and a fair
degree of ambiguity to the overall normative regime pertaining to such
phenomena. Prominent commentators in fact welcome this situation, or at least
maintain that it is unavoidable in a global legal environment and therefore
227should be accommodated. Legal pluralism has also been invoked in
connection with BITs to suggest that normative pressure from sources other
than BITs may prevent the original bargain from becoming obsolete.228 We
tend to agree with these observations. We assert, however, that against this
legally pluralistic backdrop, BITs fail to achieve the objective of dispelling
uncertainty for the reasons we have elaborated.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 7 and 30.
224. See supra Section W.A.
225. See Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture, Law, and
Corporate Governance, 25 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 229 (2005) (linking investor rights to cultural
harmony in Schwartz's model); Jordan I. Siegel, Amir N. Licht & Shalom H. Schwartz, Egalitarianism
and International Investment 1 (Sep. 19, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract-899082 (linking laws granting rights to the sick, elderly, and unemployed to cultural
egalitarianism).
226. For general discussions, see Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International
Law, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 301 (2007); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
1155 (2007); and William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 963
(2004).
227. See Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 226; Andreas Fischer-Lescano &
Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999 (2004).
228. Yackee, supra note 57, at 810-12.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Where does our analysis of the tension between the aspiration of BITs to
provide security and stability to foreign investors and the inevitable complexity
embedded in the concept of property lead in terms of policy implications for
cross-border investment protection?
Since fragmentation poses a problem, one rather straightforward answer
advanced in the literature has been that the international law on cross-border
investment should aspire to more harmony. Several scholars thus have called
for the development of a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI), which
could also build on the considerable experience of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in the context of transnational trade law.229 Others,
troubled by the alleged inconsistency among different awards handed down by
ad hoc tribunals working under the auspices of ICSID and other venues, have
called for the promotion of a more harmonious interpretation of treaty
provisions across different BITs.230 Some writers have advocated for an
institutional reorganization of cross-border dispute resolution, for instance,
through the creation of "an independent, permanent appellate body with the
authority to review awards rendered under a variety of investment treaties."23'
The foregoing analysis leads us to conclude that although fragmentation
poses a challenge to international investment, it cannot be readily solved by
crafting harmonization mechanisms that would simultaneously disregard the
root causes of the various facets of heterogeneity that we have identified in this
Article. Drafting a multilateral agreement on investment or setting up an
appellate tribunal would not solve the jurisprudential problem posed by BIT-
based property rights, which form but one layer in an entire array of property
rights and duties pertaining to a given asset located in a given host country. In
this respect, one can learn a few lessons from the recent ECHR's decision in
the JA. Pye case,232 in which the Court realized that Convention-based
intervention in the context of domestic adverse possession law would have a
dramatic impact on the fundamentals of English private law. Recognizing the
complexity of "legal matters such as land law" was thus not only a matter of
conventional judicial deference, but rather reflected a broader-based
institutional and jurisprudential inquiry into the complicated relationship
between overlapping layers of legal ordering and the complex construction of
229. For views advocating a switch to a multilateral agreement, see, for example, Leal-Arcas,
supra note 15; and Stephan W. Schill, Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored-
Nation Clauses, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 496 (2009).
230. See Anne van Aaken, Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of International
Investment Law, in 17 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 91 (2006). Other authors, however, have been less
concerned about the practical effects of such incoherence in tribunal awards. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner,
Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented International Law, 102
AM. J. INT'L L. 475 (2008). Similarly, the history of ICSID and in particular the history of the term
"investment" may reflect a drafting decision to leave room for differing interpretations. See Julian Davis
Mortenson, The Meaning of "Investment": ICSID's Travaux and the Domain of International
Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257 (2010).
231. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2005).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 109-120.
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property systems.233 The Court thus seems to have realized that imposing a
certain "supranational" content to a specific provision in the English adverse
possession law, without regard to the broader implications that this would have
on English land law, would run the risk of undermining land law's overall
structure.
Moreover, to the extent that the definition of "investment" in international
treaties continues to be practically all-inclusive, a mechanical harmonization
would only exacerbate the problem by subjecting different types of resources,
whose domestic legal ordering may be based on fundamentally different
normative and institutional underpinnings, to a "universal" set of rules.
Imposing a one-size-fits-all property jurisprudence to illuminate the meaning of
"fair and equitable treatment" or of "expropriation" for land, intellectual
property, chattels, or shares would create prohibitive constraints on each one of
the host countries, be it "Northern" or "Southern."
More generally, there may be an underappreciated virtue to the dyadic
nature of investment treaties that goes beyond the conventional evolutionary
explanation pointing to the high costs of negotiating a multilateral treaty. 234it
may very well be that since foreign investments, and the set of rules that apply
to them, integrate into otherwise domestic property systems, a bilateral treaty
may create an opportunity for both countries to recognize and address potential
cultural, social, and political heterogeneities between the two societies and their
respective legal systems. The inability of model BITs drafted by prominent
Western countries ex ante to clear away ambiguities and uncertainties that
would arise during the ongoing implementation of a BIT-the explosion of
formal investor-state disputes attesting to this latter fact235 -may therefore lead
to a recognition of the limits of cross-border property protection.
With this in mind, how should the property jurisprudence of international
investment proceed from here? One possible option would be to move to a
functional, category-based approach of defining the legal rights and duties of
foreign investors and signatory states based on the level and scope of
heterogeneity versus homogeneity in the different attributes of property
systems, as discussed in detail in Part IV.
For example, to the extent that a certain resource is typified by having a
large and indefinite number of heterogeneous actors that are strongly affected
by any change or intervention in the property regime, the interpretation of
terms such as "fair and equitable treatment," as well as the more general
aspirations toward cross-BIT congruence, should be more modest. In such
233. JA. Pye II, App. No. 44302/02, 75 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 30, 2007), available at
http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink, then search "Pye," then follow
link to case title).
234. See, e.g., Ryan J. Bubb & Susan Rose-Ackerman, BITs and Bargains: Strategic Aspects of
Bilateral and Multilateral Regulation of Foreign Investment, 27 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 291, 293-97,
307-09 (2007); cf Mortenson, supra note 230.
235. Until April 1998, only fourteen cases had been brought before ICSID. Since the late
1990s, however, the number of cases has increased dramatically. At the end of 2008, the cumulative
number of known treaty-based cases had reached 317, involving at least seventy-seven governments.
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 17, at 33-35; U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev.,
supra note 63, at 34.
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cases, the foreign investment generally should be governed by the rules of the
host country's property system, differentiating the foreign investor only when
she herself has been singled out by the host country, such as by being deprived
of "national treatment" or of due process of law in a case involving an
investment-specific regulation. Conversely, property systems that are more
susceptible to harmonization due to long-standing cross-border similarities
among affected actors regarding norms and practices of resource control may
be more appropriate for efforts toward multilateralism, cross-BIT interpretation
of treaty terms, and unified jurisdictional dispute-resolution. Land law may
represent the former type of cases. Negotiable instruments and certain
intangibles may lean toward the latter. Corporate governance and intellectual
property rights may occupy a middle ground. But this is just a rough call. We
leave the endeavor of delineating the full spectrum of BIT property protection
along the heterogeneity-homogeneity scale for future research.
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APPENDIX: CULTURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION
This Appendix conducts a short-form empirical analysis of the
relationship between culture and property rights protection. We take advantage
of recently available data on property rights protection to extend the analysis by
Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz of culture and social norms of governance-
namely, the rule of law, noncorruption, and democratic accountability. 236 Here,
we describe the new data on the dependent variable and briefly overview our
cultural independent variable. Readers who are interested in a more detailed
exposition of the theory and analytical framework are referred to this study.
The property rights data comes from the International Property Rights
Index (IPRI) 2009 Report. 237 The IPRI is produced by the Property Rights
Alliance. The IPRI is a long-term project that seeks to improve property rights
systems around the world by showing the relationship between a strong
property rights system and a country's economic wellbeing.23 The IPRI is a
cross-country, comparative, composite index comprising three sub-indices,
each of which is also composite. These sub-indices cover the following
subjects: legal and political environment (LP), physical property rights (PPR),
and intellectual property rights (IPR). We focus on the latter two indices. The
PPR combines data on protection of physical property rights, registering
property, and access to loans; the IPR combines data on protection of
intellectual property rights, patent protection, and copyright piracy.239
240
The methodology of composite indices is widely used in economics. In
the present context, one might be concerned that the policy inclination of the
Property Rights Alliance would bias the index and, consequently, the results.
Such concern is unfounded for two reasons. First, a good deal of the data
subsumed in these indices consists of objective facts. For instance, in the PPR
index, one of the items is the number of days required to register property in a
country. In the IPR index, one of the items is the scope of membership in
intellectual property treaties. Second, since we seek to examine the link
between property rights protection and culture, which is a normative social
institution, that the indices may reflect a certain policy is actually an advantage.
Our primary explanatory variable is countries' cultural orientations, as
operationalized by Schwartz in particular, on the dimension of embeddedness
versus autonomy. We also use data for orientations on the other two
dimensions in the Schwartz model: hierarchy (versus egalitarianism) and
harmony (versus mastery). Orientation scores are the average importance of the
value items that represent each orientation, using a sample of fifteen thousand
236. Licht et al., supra note 13 1. To use a metaphor from intellectual property terminology, the
present analysis resembles a patent of addition in that it makes an innovative step forward but one that
depends on the "parent" patent.
237. PROPERTY RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX (IPRI) 2009
REPORT, available at http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org.
238. Id. at 3.
239. See id. at 15-17 for a detailed discussion of the data and methodology.
240. For a detailed discussion, see Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi,
Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 52 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2006).
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respondents in over fifty countries. Crucially, the analyses are at the country
(culture) level, not the individual level-individuals are unaware of the societal
average value emphases. 241 We use the basic specification from Licht et al.'s
article, which includes one cultural orientation from each of the three Schwartz
dimensions and two control variables-one each for British heritage and
economic inequality. We control for possible influence of British heritage by
coding if the country had been under British rule as a colony, mandate area, etc.
We control for economic inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. The
instrumental variable for embeddedness in the Two-Step-Least-Squares (2SLS)
regressions is the grammatical rule on pronoun drop license in the country's
official or main language.242
Table Al presents the regressions. The results are striking. Embeddedness
exhibits a strong, negative coefficient as an explanatory variable for both PPR
protection and IPR protection. This result holds fully in the 2SLS regressions,
indicating that the relation of cultural embeddedness to property rights
protection is causal, i.e., that a country's fundamental societal orientation
toward autonomy or embeddedness affects the degree to which its particular
institutions protect property rights (as the latter is operationalized by the IPRI).
Interestingly, the results are more pronounced for intellectual property than for
physical property. This may be the case because intellectual property is a
relatively recent legal phenomenon, such that informal social norms (e.g.,
regarding copyright piracy), which are linked to cultural orientations, exhibit
greater cross-country variability. That the R-squared values are higher for
intellectual property than for physical property is consistent with this idea.
241. See Schwartz, supra note 128; Shalom H. Schwartz, Mapping and Interpreting Cultural
Differences around the World, in COMPARING CULTURES: DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 43 (Henk Vinken, Joseph Soeters & Peter Ester eds., 2004); Shalom H.
Schwartz, A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications, 5 COMP. Soc. 137
(2006). The cultural scores used here are available in Licht et al., supra note 131, 684-85 tbl. A.3.
242. See Licht et al., supra note 131, for further details.
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Dependent variables: PPR = physical property rights; IPR = intellectual
property rights.
Standardized beta coefficients are presented. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
1652011]1
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 36: 115
Table A2. List of Sample Countries with Culture and Property Rights Data
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Macedonia
Malaysia
Mexico
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Russia
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
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